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Table of Content 期刊目录
Miaojie Yu
Pages: 97-99
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Pages: 100-108
Chad P. Bown
Pages: 109-136
Liugang Sheng, Honyan Zhao & Jing Zhao
Pages: 137-159
Miaojie Yu & Rui Zhang
Pages: 160-174
Larry D. Qiu & Xing Wei
Pages: 175-194
Daniel Trefler
Pages: 195-207
Mari Pangestu
Pages: 208-230
Laixun Zhao
Pages: 231-244
Article Abstract 文章摘要
Miaojie Yu
Pages: 97-99
Abstract：
One of the most important international economic events in 2018 was the China-U.S. “trade war.” With China’s growing role in the worldwide economy and geopolitical impacts, the United States has labeled China as a strategy competitor. This notes briefly introduce the six articles covered in the volume. We highlight the causes and possible economic consequences from the perspectives of the United States, China, Japan, the Europe, and even East Asian countries like Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1616919
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Pages: 100-108
Abstract:
American policy towards China is now up for grabs, with hardliners and soft-liners battling for the upper hand. The hardliners view China as an existential threat to American security and interests. The soft-liners regard China as a powerful counterpart, on occasion friend, competitor, or adversary, but not an existential threat. In my view, the hardline approach – to be pursued through protectionist trade policies and aggressive technology policies — would prove disastrous, weakening the world economy and creating a self-fulfilling grave risk of future conflict.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1601811
Chad P. Bown
Pages: 109-136
Abstract:
In 2018, the United States suddenly increased tariffs on nearly 50 percent of its imports from China. China immediately responded with tariff retaliation covering more than 70 percent of imports from the United States. This article assesses what happened in 2018 and attempts to explain why. It first constructs new measure of special tariff protection to put the sheer scope and coverage of the 2018 actions into historical context. It then uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. This includes whether China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industrial subsidies, as well as China’s development strategy and system of forcibly acquiring foreign technology, were imposing increasingly large costs on trading partners. Finally, it also examines whether the US strategy to provoke a crisis – which may result in a severely weakened World Trade Organization (WTO) – was deliberate and out of frustration with the institution itself.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1608047
Liugang Sheng, Honyan Zhao & Jing Zhao
Pages: 137-159
Abstract:
The escalating U.S.–China trade conflicts have increasingly shadowed the outlook of the world economy. The Trump administration aims to achieve its strategic goals including reducing current account deficits, promoting the U.S. manufacturing sector, and curbing Chinese high-tech industries by waging the trade war against China. This paper argues that the current account deficits and the declining manufacturing sector in the U.S. are mainly driven by its internal structural factors, such as low saving rates, high labor costs, and rising service sector, rather than by the import competition from China. Moreover, the trade war further deteriorates the U.S. current account deficits and erode its comparative advantage, and it forces China to invest more in technological innovation and human capital, and thus promote its progress in high-tech industries. Thus, the U.S. will not be able to achieve its strategical goals and eventually lose the trade war.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1603634
Miaojie Yu & Rui Zhang
Pages: 160-174
Abstract:
To understand Sino-U.S. trade relations, this article interprets the trade imbalance between China and the United States from the Trump administration’s perspective. The Trump administration claims that the Chinese government’s subsidies and high import tariffs cause the Sino-U.S. trade deficit, resulting in job losses in the U.S. The Trump administration therefore argues that imposing high tariffs on Chinese exports can resolve the deficit. The article finds that U.S. statistical accounting overestimates the deficit. Reducing China’s imports cannot increase U.S. employment, and China provides the United States with low-price and high-quality products. Chinese investors tend to invest the surplus by purchasing U.S. Treasury bonds. In addition, the United States limits Chinese investments due to ‘national security’ concerns. China’s upgrading to the high end of the global value chain is a consequence of economic development. Therefore, the two countries should rebalance Sino-U.S. trade by seeking economic and trade cooperation via trade negotiations.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1605678
Larry D. Qiu & Xing Wei
Pages: 175-194
Abstract:
In this study, we examine various aspects of China’s trade, the U.S.’ trade, and the bilateral trade between the two countries. The analysis of each aspect has direct and indirect implications on trade conflicts between the two countries. We focus on important factors, such as the growth of trade, import penetration, increased competitiveness of Chinese firms, comparative advantages of Chinese goods, China’s WTO entry and its compliance, and bilateral trade imbalance. While each of the factors can lead to trade frictions, individual factors will not have led to a large-scale trade war. These factors converge within a brief period and thus can be considered the China shock, thereby making other countries’ adjustments to their economic structures difficult. Therefore, trade frictions are inevitable.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1598014
- The China-OECD trade divide: building bridges
Daniel Trefler
Pages: 195-207
Abstract:
Today’s largest trade frictions stem from differences between China and the OECD regarding the appropriate role of government. There are two types of differences. The first are legitimate attitudinal differences towards industrial policy (the use of subsidies), competition policy (the use of forced industry consolidation), and innovation policy (weak protections of intellectual property). China and the OECD will have to reach an accommodation on these differences if the end game is a rules-based trading system. Accommodation is possible, but unfortunately, both the US and China are adopting bullying tactics that diminish the effectiveness of the WTO and threaten the current rules-based system. The second class of differences is political and reflects China’s intentional lack of policy transparency and its generosity towards favoured firms. These differences will never be WTO compliant and China must either reform or give up its access to OECD markets.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1603644
- China–US trade War: an Indonesian perspective
Mari Pangestu
Pages: 208-230
Abstract:
This paper takes a wholistic approach to the effect of US-China trade war on Indonesia. The paper starts by laying out the context of the rise of protectionism and nationalism, comparing developed and developing country context, and its various causes such as unequal distribution of benefits and responses to the rise of China. The new US approach fousing on goods trade deficit, targeting mainly China but also other countries, including Indonesia and it should be seen as a tool to address the real concerns of the US regarding unfair trade, such as technology transfer, industrial subsidies and trade and investment distortions. It also reflects the US view of the inadequcy of the WTO. In terms of direct impact, the US-China trade war is creating uncertainties to global growth and in particular any decline in China’s growth is likely to hit Indonesia and other ASEAN countries given that China has become their number one trading partner. As for pbenefit from trade diversion and investment relocation to avoid the trade war, given the structure of its exports and lack of integration in the Global Value Chians, Indonesia is unlikley to benefit compared to several other Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam. However, any net benefit from this, will far outweigh the cost of the uncertainty in the rules based multilateral trading system (MTS) and the retreat of the US leadership to safeguard the MTS. The paper looks at how the current US unilateralism is framed in a carrot and stick approach, which does not benefit developing countries like Indonesia. To fill the leadership vacuum to maintain an open rules based order, other countries need to take the leadership position. This can be done by pursuing their own unilateral agenda of structural reforms, increasing regional economic integration and take collective leadership to conduct necessary reforms of the WTO especially on issues that are at the heart of the US-China trade war such as industrial subsidies, strengthening IPR, investment issues related to technology transfer, and competition policy and the level playing field.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1611084
- Through trade wars, East Asians finally learning to cooperate with each other?
Laixun Zhao
Pages: 231-244
Abstract:
In this paper, I examine the Sino-U.S. trade disputes from less-talked about angles: institutional differences, SOEs, hukou control and contemporary Chinese history. Based on these, I provide suggestions for future cooperation and improvement.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2019.1607401
