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博士后workshop| Judicial Independence under the Weak Rule of Law: Evidence from Administrative Litigation Reform in China
发布日期：2022-05-19 12:00 来源：
题目：Judicial Independence under the Weak Rule of Law: Evidence from Administrative Litigation Reform in China
主讲人：曹光宇（普林斯顿大学当代中国研究中心博士后研究员）
时间：2022年5月19日（周四）上午9:30 — 11:00
ZOOM链接：https://princeton.zoom.us/j/91008732272
会议号：910 0873 2272
报告摘要：
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about the effectiveness of strengthening judicial independence in developing countries with weak rule of law. This paper exploits China's recent judicial reform in administrative litigation, which changed the jurisdiction rule from intra-regional to trans-regional, to estimate the effects of improved judicial independence on protecting private entities against potential abuses of public authority. We find a significant increase in the probability of successfully suing local governments after the reform, especially when defendants are more powerful government departments and plaintiffs are natural persons (presumably weaker than legal persons). But this effect is much weaker for higher-level governments. The reform also results in increased case filings, prolonged trial time, and enhanced judicial quality. Furthermore, the reform raises the awareness of both governments and citizens about the rule of law but produces a side effect (at least in the short run) - general public attitudes toward local governments worsen and new firm entry slows down after the reform. In total, our study highlights the effect of trans-regional jurisdiction on facilitating judicial independence's positive role in protecting the rights of private entities even in a party state and its potential limitations.
主讲人简介：
曹光宇，普林斯顿大学当代中国研究中心博士后研究员，北京大学光华管理学院经济学博士，研究领域为数字经济和公共经济学，研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics和《经济研究》等期刊。
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博士后workshop| Judicial Independence under the Weak Rule of Law: Evidence from Administrative Litigation Reform in China
发布日期：2022-05-19 12:00 来源：
题目：Judicial Independence under the Weak Rule of Law: Evidence from Administrative Litigation Reform in China
主讲人：曹光宇（普林斯顿大学当代中国研究中心博士后研究员）
时间：2022年5月19日（周四）上午9:30 — 11:00
ZOOM链接：https://princeton.zoom.us/j/91008732272
会议号：910 0873 2272
报告摘要：
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about the effectiveness of strengthening judicial independence in developing countries with weak rule of law. This paper exploits China's recent judicial reform in administrative litigation, which changed the jurisdiction rule from intra-regional to trans-regional, to estimate the effects of improved judicial independence on protecting private entities against potential abuses of public authority. We find a significant increase in the probability of successfully suing local governments after the reform, especially when defendants are more powerful government departments and plaintiffs are natural persons (presumably weaker than legal persons). But this effect is much weaker for higher-level governments. The reform also results in increased case filings, prolonged trial time, and enhanced judicial quality. Furthermore, the reform raises the awareness of both governments and citizens about the rule of law but produces a side effect (at least in the short run) - general public attitudes toward local governments worsen and new firm entry slows down after the reform. In total, our study highlights the effect of trans-regional jurisdiction on facilitating judicial independence's positive role in protecting the rights of private entities even in a party state and its potential limitations.
主讲人简介：
曹光宇，普林斯顿大学当代中国研究中心博士后研究员，北京大学光华管理学院经济学博士，研究领域为数字经济和公共经济学，研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics和《经济研究》等期刊。
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