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环境与能源经济学workshop：We hear you: public complaints and environmental enforcement
发布日期：2024-04-26 12:00 来源：
主讲人：刘梦迪（对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院）
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）上午10:00-12:00（北京时间）
地点：北京大学承泽园249教室
摘要：Environmental complaints by the public are a low-cost source of information and a potential means by which local officials can improve the local environment through the identification of illegal polluting activity. However, responding to complaints may divert limited resources from other enforcement activities. This paper investigates the impact of environmental complaints on the allocation and intensity of on-site inspections on the environmental governance of Jiangsu province which is one of the more heavily industrialized provinces in China. Estimating a Local Projection estimator, we find that complaints trigger an immediate and sustained response from the regulator, increasing the probability of an inspection by about 15% in the month of the complaint and continuing to increase over the following two months. Complaints do not significantly reduce the number of other types of inspections and may even increase the number of unplanned inspections, thereby increasing overall regulatory intensity. Complaints also increase the probability of regulators subsequently detecting environmental violations. Our study suggests that encouraging public complaints act as a bottom-up approach to regulation that can effectively complement the existing inspection system.
主讲人简介：
刘梦迪，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授，博士生导师。分别于2014年和2019年在南京大学获得学士学位和博士学位，并在亚利桑那大学接受博士联合培养。刘梦迪博士长期从事环境治理与政策分析相关研究。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目。研究成果发表于American Economic Review、American Journal of Political Science、Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Policy Analysis and Management、Journal of Environmental Economics and Management等高水平期刊。研究获得美国政治科学协会Evan Ringquist最佳论文奖。
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环境与能源经济学workshop：We hear you: public complaints and environmental enforcement
发布日期：2024-04-26 12:00 来源：
主讲人：刘梦迪（对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院）
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）上午10:00-12:00（北京时间）
地点：北京大学承泽园249教室
摘要：Environmental complaints by the public are a low-cost source of information and a potential means by which local officials can improve the local environment through the identification of illegal polluting activity. However, responding to complaints may divert limited resources from other enforcement activities. This paper investigates the impact of environmental complaints on the allocation and intensity of on-site inspections on the environmental governance of Jiangsu province which is one of the more heavily industrialized provinces in China. Estimating a Local Projection estimator, we find that complaints trigger an immediate and sustained response from the regulator, increasing the probability of an inspection by about 15% in the month of the complaint and continuing to increase over the following two months. Complaints do not significantly reduce the number of other types of inspections and may even increase the number of unplanned inspections, thereby increasing overall regulatory intensity. Complaints also increase the probability of regulators subsequently detecting environmental violations. Our study suggests that encouraging public complaints act as a bottom-up approach to regulation that can effectively complement the existing inspection system.
主讲人简介：
刘梦迪，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授，博士生导师。分别于2014年和2019年在南京大学获得学士学位和博士学位，并在亚利桑那大学接受博士联合培养。刘梦迪博士长期从事环境治理与政策分析相关研究。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目。研究成果发表于American Economic Review、American Journal of Political Science、Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Policy Analysis and Management、Journal of Environmental Economics and Management等高水平期刊。研究获得美国政治科学协会Evan Ringquist最佳论文奖。
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