-
首页
-
- 首页
- WORKSHOP预告
微观workshop:Market Structure and Adverse Selection
发布日期：2023-12-14 12:00 来源：
微观理论工作坊
时间：12月14日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：黄大康（西南财经大学助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Market Structure and Adverse Selection
摘要：This paper adopts a unified perspective on multi-contracting in competitive markets plagued by adverse selection. We subsume the two polar cases of exclusive and nonexclusive competition by introducing the concept of a market structure, i.e., a trading rule that specifies the subset of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. The existing literature shows that the market structure matters greatly in shaping competitive allocations, allowing for either separating allocations (as shown by Rothschild-Stiglitz) or layered pooling (Jaynes-Hellwig-Glosten) allocations. We prove the existence of intermediate “Pooling + Separating” equilibria that allow for simultaneous pooling and low-risk buyer separation. Crucially, those allocations alleviate at the same time the concern of excessive rationing under separation of and cross-subsidies paid by low-risk buyers. They oftentimes Pareto dominate the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. Our analysis singles out the ``1+1" market structure where sellers are separated into two subgroups so that buyers can trade with at most one seller from each subgroup. Any “Pooling + Separating” allocation is an equilibrium here. Finally, we prove that “Pooling + Separating” allocations satisfy a notion of stability that we call serendipitous-aftermarket-proofness.
主讲人介绍：Dakang Huang, who received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2023, is currently an Assistant Professor at the China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance, School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. His main areas of research include contract theory, information economics, competitive markets, and mechanism design. His website is: https://www.dakang-huang.com/
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
微观workshop:Market Structure and Adverse Selection
发布日期：2023-12-14 12:00 来源：
微观理论工作坊
时间：12月14日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：黄大康（西南财经大学助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Market Structure and Adverse Selection
摘要：This paper adopts a unified perspective on multi-contracting in competitive markets plagued by adverse selection. We subsume the two polar cases of exclusive and nonexclusive competition by introducing the concept of a market structure, i.e., a trading rule that specifies the subset of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. The existing literature shows that the market structure matters greatly in shaping competitive allocations, allowing for either separating allocations (as shown by Rothschild-Stiglitz) or layered pooling (Jaynes-Hellwig-Glosten) allocations. We prove the existence of intermediate “Pooling + Separating” equilibria that allow for simultaneous pooling and low-risk buyer separation. Crucially, those allocations alleviate at the same time the concern of excessive rationing under separation of and cross-subsidies paid by low-risk buyers. They oftentimes Pareto dominate the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. Our analysis singles out the ``1+1" market structure where sellers are separated into two subgroups so that buyers can trade with at most one seller from each subgroup. Any “Pooling + Separating” allocation is an equilibrium here. Finally, we prove that “Pooling + Separating” allocations satisfy a notion of stability that we call serendipitous-aftermarket-proofness.
主讲人介绍：Dakang Huang, who received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2023, is currently an Assistant Professor at the China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance, School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. His main areas of research include contract theory, information economics, competitive markets, and mechanism design. His website is: https://www.dakang-huang.com/
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
