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微观理论Workshop：Persuasion of a Continuum
发布日期：2023-11-16 12:00 来源：
微观理论工作坊
时间：11月16日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：Carl Heese（香港大学助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Persuasion of a Continuum
摘要：I analyze a model of Bayesian Persuasion with a continuum of receivers and with binary actions. The sender’s payoff depends on the distribution of the share s of the receivers choosing his preferred action. The sender can correlate the receivers’ signals in any way.
I characterize all obedient signal structures in terms of a single majorization constraint, and this yields a geometric approach to calculating the equilibrium distribution of s.
When the sender’s payoff is (Schur)-convex, it is optimal to maximally correlate the receiver’s signals given the constraint. When the sender’s payoff is (Schur-)concave, independent signals are optimal. I provide constructions of an optimal signal in other cases, e.g., when the sender’s payoff is cut-off in s. Finally, I consider applications to voting, sales, and team production, and provide a series of results showing that persuasion becomes harder if a sender faces more disperse senders (in terms of prior beliefs, abilities, etc.).
主讲人介绍：Dr. Heese is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Hong Kong, specializing in Political Economy and Microeconomic Theory. He has a Master’s degree in Mathematics from the University of Münster, awarded with distinction and valuable experience in investment banking and consulting in Europe. After that, he went on to earn his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bonn, achieving the highest distinction of summa cum laude. He has had the privilege of researching and teaching at prestigious institutions such as Yale and the London School of Economics, and prior to joining HKU, as an Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna.
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首页
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微观理论Workshop：Persuasion of a Continuum
发布日期：2023-11-16 12:00 来源：
微观理论工作坊
时间：11月16日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：Carl Heese（香港大学助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Persuasion of a Continuum
摘要：I analyze a model of Bayesian Persuasion with a continuum of receivers and with binary actions. The sender’s payoff depends on the distribution of the share s of the receivers choosing his preferred action. The sender can correlate the receivers’ signals in any way.
I characterize all obedient signal structures in terms of a single majorization constraint, and this yields a geometric approach to calculating the equilibrium distribution of s.
When the sender’s payoff is (Schur)-convex, it is optimal to maximally correlate the receiver’s signals given the constraint. When the sender’s payoff is (Schur-)concave, independent signals are optimal. I provide constructions of an optimal signal in other cases, e.g., when the sender’s payoff is cut-off in s. Finally, I consider applications to voting, sales, and team production, and provide a series of results showing that persuasion becomes harder if a sender faces more disperse senders (in terms of prior beliefs, abilities, etc.).
主讲人介绍：Dr. Heese is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Hong Kong, specializing in Political Economy and Microeconomic Theory. He has a Master’s degree in Mathematics from the University of Münster, awarded with distinction and valuable experience in investment banking and consulting in Europe. After that, he went on to earn his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bonn, achieving the highest distinction of summa cum laude. He has had the privilege of researching and teaching at prestigious institutions such as Yale and the London School of Economics, and prior to joining HKU, as an Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna.
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