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sidenav header backgroundCCER讨论稿:Markets Price Politicians:Evidence from China’s Municipal Bond Markets
发布日期:2022-05-18 05:27 来源:
E2022007 2022-05-18
He Wang
Development Research Group, The World Bank
Email: hwang21@worldbank.org.
Yang Yao
China Center for Economic Research and National School of Development,
Peking University
Email: yyao@nsd.pku.edu.cn.
Yue Zhou
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Email: yue.zhou@graduateinstitute.ch
Abstract
This paper studies China’s municipal bond markets to find whether mayors’ abilities to grow
the economy is priced by investors. Studying the primary market, we find that a one standard deviation increase in a mayor’s ability reduces investors’ bidding prices by 11.4 basis points. A study of the secondary market finds similar results. Ability has stronger impacts on bonds with longer terms, issued by issuers with lower ratings or issued in more competitive markets. Ability also has stronger impacts in the first year of a mayor’s tenure and on bonds issued by economically or financially less developed cities.
Keywords: political human capital, municipal bonds, executive constraints
JEL classification: G12, H11, P43