-
首页
-
出版物展开 / 收起
sidenav background出版物
sidenav header background讨论稿No. E2011002:Exports and Credit Constraints under Incomplete Information:Theory and Evidence from China
发布日期：2011-04-27 09:43 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Robert Feenstra[2] Zhiyuan Li[3] Miaojie Yu[4]
No. E2011002 April 26, 2011
[Abstract] This paper examines why credit constraints for domestic and exporting firms arise in a setting where banks do not observe firms' productivities. To maintain incentive-compatibility, banks lend below the amount needed for first-best production. The longer time needed for export shipments induces a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters' home market. Greater risk faced by exporters also affects the credit extended by banks. Extra fixed costs reduce exports on the extensive margin, but can be offset by collateral held by exporting firms. The empirical application to Chinese firms strongly supports these theoretical results, and we find a sizable impact of the financial crisis in reducing exports.
Key words: Export, Credit Constraint, Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneous Productivity, Chinese Firms
JEL: F1, F3, D9, G2
No. E2011002
[1] We thank Kyle Bagwell, Kalina Monova, Larry Qiu, and participants at the NBER, Harvard, University of Vitoria, University of Queensland, Tsinghua University for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71003010) are gratefully acknowledged.
[2]Department of Economics, University of California-Davis and NBER. Email: rcfeenstra@ucdavis.edu
[3]School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China. Email: zhyli@mail.shufe.edu.cn
[4]China Center for Economic Research (CCER), Peking University, Beijing, China. Email: mjyu@ccer.pku.edu.cn.
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
出版物展开 / 收起
sidenav background出版物
sidenav header background讨论稿No. E2011002:Exports and Credit Constraints under Incomplete Information:Theory and Evidence from China
发布日期：2011-04-27 09:43 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Robert Feenstra[2] Zhiyuan Li[3] Miaojie Yu[4]
No. E2011002 April 26, 2011
[Abstract] This paper examines why credit constraints for domestic and exporting firms arise in a setting where banks do not observe firms' productivities. To maintain incentive-compatibility, banks lend below the amount needed for first-best production. The longer time needed for export shipments induces a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters' home market. Greater risk faced by exporters also affects the credit extended by banks. Extra fixed costs reduce exports on the extensive margin, but can be offset by collateral held by exporting firms. The empirical application to Chinese firms strongly supports these theoretical results, and we find a sizable impact of the financial crisis in reducing exports.
Key words: Export, Credit Constraint, Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneous Productivity, Chinese Firms
JEL: F1, F3, D9, G2
No. E2011002
[1] We thank Kyle Bagwell, Kalina Monova, Larry Qiu, and participants at the NBER, Harvard, University of Vitoria, University of Queensland, Tsinghua University for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71003010) are gratefully acknowledged.
[2]Department of Economics, University of California-Davis and NBER. Email: rcfeenstra@ucdavis.edu
[3]School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China. Email: zhyli@mail.shufe.edu.cn
[4]China Center for Economic Research (CCER), Peking University, Beijing, China. Email: mjyu@ccer.pku.edu.cn.
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
