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sidenav header backgroundChina Economic Journal Volume 11. No. 3. 2018目录/摘要
发布日期：2018-11-15 04:48 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Table of Content 期刊目录
Forty years of Open and Reform: in restrospect and in prospectYan Shen
Pages: 225-227
An Anatomy of the Chinese selectocracyYang Yao
Pages: 228-242
Population dividend and economic growth in China, 1978–2018Cai Fang
Pages: 243-258
China’s rural institutions and governance since the beginning of the rural reformLiu Shouying & Xiong Xuefeng
Pages: 259-283
The Long-Drawn Process of reform of the Exchange Rate Regime and the Evolution of China’s Exchange Rate PolicyYu Yongding
Pages: 284-300
China’s international trade development and opening-up policy design over the past four decadesMiaojie Yu
Pages: 301-318
Understanding the U.S.-China Trade WarTao Liu & Wing Thye Woo
Pages: 319-340
Article Abstract 文章摘要
Forty years of Open and Reform: in restrospect and in prospectYan Shen
Pages: 225-227
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1529876
An Anatomy of the Chinese selectocracyYang Yao
Pages: 228-242
Abstract:
The Chinese regime is a self-contained polity that is best described by selectocracy, i.e. a polity that selects officials by a centralized mechanism. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the selectorate. Throughout the process of reform, the party has been de-politicized, so the central government has become disinterested with regard to the conflicts in society, which enables it to adopt identity-blind and growth-enhancing policies. The selectoracy’s selection process is open, competitive and meritocratic. It puts more emphasis on responsibility, not accountability, as incentive to illicit performance from local officials. This ensures that the central government’s policies are carried out in the country.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516274
Population dividend and economic growth in China, 1978–2018Cai Fang
Pages: 243-258
Abstract:
China witnessed important demographic transitions during the past 40 years. The significant decline in fertility rate, as a result of both policy change and economic factors, generated the so-called population dividends – rising proportion of working age population – during the past several decades. This paper demonstrates important channels through which broadly defined population dividends contribute to economic growth in China, by magnifying roles of capital, by improving labor quality, alongside increases in labor supply, and by strengthening labor mobility. As population aging now takes over from population dividends as the main demographic trend, it is possible for China to continue its strong growth by focusing on both the traditional growth factors, such as further reducing the proportion of agricultural workers, and new growth factors, such as further improving productivity by strengthening human capital and weakening institutional obstacles.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1509529
China’s rural institutions and governance since the beginning of the rural reformLiu Shouying & Xiong Xuefeng
Pages: 259-283
Abstract:
This paper looks at how China governs its vast rural territories. The structure of rural governance relies not only on the extent and form of the state’s authority, but also on the principal–agent relationship between the state and local stakeholders, as well as the role of the informal institutional arrangements that serve as the foundation for rural governance. China’s 40 years of reform and opening have led to the transformation of rural China into urban and rural China. The rules and order of informal institutions have evolved and changed significantly, and the cost-benefit structure of formal state governance has been amended. The appropriate rural governance system for village transformation improves the performance of the country’s direct governance and the entrustment–agent system for village governance. Further, the rural governance system balances formal and informal institutions to achieve an effective institutional arrangement.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1512541
The Long-Drawn Process of reform of the Exchange Rate Regime and the Evolution of China’s Exchange Rate PolicyYu Yongding
Pages: 284-300
Abstract:
An inflexible exchange rate not only brings the traditional problem of impossible trinity but also contributes to the formation of China’s irrational international balance of payments structure characterized by the so-called twin surpluses (current account and capital account surpluses). As a result, though China has some 2 trillion USD net foreign assets, it runs investment income deficits for more than a decade. Furthermore, when the RMB is under appreciation pressure, the inflexibility brings about inflows of hot money. When the RMB is under depreciation pressure, the inflexibility facilitates the unwinding of carry trade and capital flights. On the whole, China is too cautious in reforming its exchange rate regime. Instead of designing various cumbersome central parity rate-setting rules, China should make up its mind to float the RMB as soon as possible.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1512542
China’s international trade development and opening-up policy design over the past four decadesMiaojie Yu
Pages: 301-318
Abstract:
China’s opening-up in the past four decades has gone through three waves: the extensive margin of opening-up (1978–2001), the intensive margin of opening-up (2001–2017), and all-around opening-up (since 2017). This paper explores these three stages of the country’s economic reform. China’s gains from trade have been inspired by different economic factors. Before the turn of the century, the large trade volume was due to the realization of comparative advantage based on the country’s factor endowment. However, after its accession to the World Trade Organization, China’s gains from trade have been due, in large part, to the realization of economic scale effects associated with the larger market.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516275
Understanding the U.S.-China Trade WarTao Liu & Wing Thye Woo
Pages: 319-340
Abstract:
Three major concerns drove the U.S. into initiating the trade war, and they are (a) the concern that China’s chronically large trade surplus was depressing job creation in the U.S. (b) the concern that China was using illegal and unfair methods to acquire U.S. technology at an effectively discounted price; and (c) the concern that China seeks to weaken U.S. national security and its international standing. On the dispute over China’s exchange rate and trade imbalance, the first conclusion is that it was marked by analytical confusion over the meaning of the term ‘equilibrium exchange rate’. The second conclusion is that China’s trade imbalance reflects the economic conditions in both China and U.S., and that the efficient and fair solution of the problem requires policy changes in both countries. On the industrial policy dispute, the first conclusion is that the issue of forced technology transfer is largely a dispute about China using its market power to benefit itself at the expense of its trade partners. The second conclusion is that China’s use of market power can last only until the other large countries could unite and retaliate as a group. The inevitability of retaliation means that China should replace the joint-venture (JV) mechanism for technological diffusion with other ways to strengthen its technological capability. On the U.S. concern about whether China trade weakens its national security, the first conclusion is that the notion of national security that is commonly adopted in the U.S. trade policy debate is ignorant about the primary determinants of U.S. capability in innovation. By focusing instead mainly on how to hold down China technologically, the long-run outcome will be a technologically weaker U.S. and hence, a more vulnerable U.S. The second conclusion is that the U.S. must identify a clear, short list of critical technologies and critical infrastructure for the recently reformed Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to cover, and update this list constantly. Otherwise, the broad and changing nature of notions about national security would allow the bureaucratically driven phenomenon of mission-creep to steadily expand the coverage of the CFIUS process, thereby steadily rendering CFIUS to be operationally capricious. Our principal policy suggestion to China is that, because China’s economy in 2018 is very different from that in 1978 (e.g. many parts of China now look like Singapore and China is Africa’s biggest donor), there should be more reciprocity in China’s trade and investment relations with the advanced economies despite China’s status as a developing economy under WTO rules. Our principal policy suggestion to President Trump is to stop equating strategic competition with economic competition. Strategic competition is normally a zero-sum game. While fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516256
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首页
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出版物展开 / 收起
sidenav background出版物
sidenav header backgroundChina Economic Journal Volume 11. No. 3. 2018目录/摘要
发布日期：2018-11-15 04:48 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Table of Content 期刊目录
Forty years of Open and Reform: in restrospect and in prospectYan Shen
Pages: 225-227
An Anatomy of the Chinese selectocracyYang Yao
Pages: 228-242
Population dividend and economic growth in China, 1978–2018Cai Fang
Pages: 243-258
China’s rural institutions and governance since the beginning of the rural reformLiu Shouying & Xiong Xuefeng
Pages: 259-283
The Long-Drawn Process of reform of the Exchange Rate Regime and the Evolution of China’s Exchange Rate PolicyYu Yongding
Pages: 284-300
China’s international trade development and opening-up policy design over the past four decadesMiaojie Yu
Pages: 301-318
Understanding the U.S.-China Trade WarTao Liu & Wing Thye Woo
Pages: 319-340
Article Abstract 文章摘要
Forty years of Open and Reform: in restrospect and in prospectYan Shen
Pages: 225-227
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1529876
An Anatomy of the Chinese selectocracyYang Yao
Pages: 228-242
Abstract:
The Chinese regime is a self-contained polity that is best described by selectocracy, i.e. a polity that selects officials by a centralized mechanism. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the selectorate. Throughout the process of reform, the party has been de-politicized, so the central government has become disinterested with regard to the conflicts in society, which enables it to adopt identity-blind and growth-enhancing policies. The selectoracy’s selection process is open, competitive and meritocratic. It puts more emphasis on responsibility, not accountability, as incentive to illicit performance from local officials. This ensures that the central government’s policies are carried out in the country.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516274
Population dividend and economic growth in China, 1978–2018Cai Fang
Pages: 243-258
Abstract:
China witnessed important demographic transitions during the past 40 years. The significant decline in fertility rate, as a result of both policy change and economic factors, generated the so-called population dividends – rising proportion of working age population – during the past several decades. This paper demonstrates important channels through which broadly defined population dividends contribute to economic growth in China, by magnifying roles of capital, by improving labor quality, alongside increases in labor supply, and by strengthening labor mobility. As population aging now takes over from population dividends as the main demographic trend, it is possible for China to continue its strong growth by focusing on both the traditional growth factors, such as further reducing the proportion of agricultural workers, and new growth factors, such as further improving productivity by strengthening human capital and weakening institutional obstacles.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1509529
China’s rural institutions and governance since the beginning of the rural reformLiu Shouying & Xiong Xuefeng
Pages: 259-283
Abstract:
This paper looks at how China governs its vast rural territories. The structure of rural governance relies not only on the extent and form of the state’s authority, but also on the principal–agent relationship between the state and local stakeholders, as well as the role of the informal institutional arrangements that serve as the foundation for rural governance. China’s 40 years of reform and opening have led to the transformation of rural China into urban and rural China. The rules and order of informal institutions have evolved and changed significantly, and the cost-benefit structure of formal state governance has been amended. The appropriate rural governance system for village transformation improves the performance of the country’s direct governance and the entrustment–agent system for village governance. Further, the rural governance system balances formal and informal institutions to achieve an effective institutional arrangement.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1512541
The Long-Drawn Process of reform of the Exchange Rate Regime and the Evolution of China’s Exchange Rate PolicyYu Yongding
Pages: 284-300
Abstract:
An inflexible exchange rate not only brings the traditional problem of impossible trinity but also contributes to the formation of China’s irrational international balance of payments structure characterized by the so-called twin surpluses (current account and capital account surpluses). As a result, though China has some 2 trillion USD net foreign assets, it runs investment income deficits for more than a decade. Furthermore, when the RMB is under appreciation pressure, the inflexibility brings about inflows of hot money. When the RMB is under depreciation pressure, the inflexibility facilitates the unwinding of carry trade and capital flights. On the whole, China is too cautious in reforming its exchange rate regime. Instead of designing various cumbersome central parity rate-setting rules, China should make up its mind to float the RMB as soon as possible.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1512542
China’s international trade development and opening-up policy design over the past four decadesMiaojie Yu
Pages: 301-318
Abstract:
China’s opening-up in the past four decades has gone through three waves: the extensive margin of opening-up (1978–2001), the intensive margin of opening-up (2001–2017), and all-around opening-up (since 2017). This paper explores these three stages of the country’s economic reform. China’s gains from trade have been inspired by different economic factors. Before the turn of the century, the large trade volume was due to the realization of comparative advantage based on the country’s factor endowment. However, after its accession to the World Trade Organization, China’s gains from trade have been due, in large part, to the realization of economic scale effects associated with the larger market.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516275
Understanding the U.S.-China Trade WarTao Liu & Wing Thye Woo
Pages: 319-340
Abstract:
Three major concerns drove the U.S. into initiating the trade war, and they are (a) the concern that China’s chronically large trade surplus was depressing job creation in the U.S. (b) the concern that China was using illegal and unfair methods to acquire U.S. technology at an effectively discounted price; and (c) the concern that China seeks to weaken U.S. national security and its international standing. On the dispute over China’s exchange rate and trade imbalance, the first conclusion is that it was marked by analytical confusion over the meaning of the term ‘equilibrium exchange rate’. The second conclusion is that China’s trade imbalance reflects the economic conditions in both China and U.S., and that the efficient and fair solution of the problem requires policy changes in both countries. On the industrial policy dispute, the first conclusion is that the issue of forced technology transfer is largely a dispute about China using its market power to benefit itself at the expense of its trade partners. The second conclusion is that China’s use of market power can last only until the other large countries could unite and retaliate as a group. The inevitability of retaliation means that China should replace the joint-venture (JV) mechanism for technological diffusion with other ways to strengthen its technological capability. On the U.S. concern about whether China trade weakens its national security, the first conclusion is that the notion of national security that is commonly adopted in the U.S. trade policy debate is ignorant about the primary determinants of U.S. capability in innovation. By focusing instead mainly on how to hold down China technologically, the long-run outcome will be a technologically weaker U.S. and hence, a more vulnerable U.S. The second conclusion is that the U.S. must identify a clear, short list of critical technologies and critical infrastructure for the recently reformed Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to cover, and update this list constantly. Otherwise, the broad and changing nature of notions about national security would allow the bureaucratically driven phenomenon of mission-creep to steadily expand the coverage of the CFIUS process, thereby steadily rendering CFIUS to be operationally capricious. Our principal policy suggestion to China is that, because China’s economy in 2018 is very different from that in 1978 (e.g. many parts of China now look like Singapore and China is Africa’s biggest donor), there should be more reciprocity in China’s trade and investment relations with the advanced economies despite China’s status as a developing economy under WTO rules. Our principal policy suggestion to President Trump is to stop equating strategic competition with economic competition. Strategic competition is normally a zero-sum game. While fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run.
Link to the original text:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516256
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