时间：5月7日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院305

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

主讲人：Hulya Eraslan（Ralph O'Connor Professor of Economics at Rice University, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research， Specially Appointed Professor at the Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of Osaka）

题目: Standoffs with Intertwined Resolve and Public Information

摘要：

Conventional wisdom, dating back to Schelling and formalized by Crawford (1982),

regards commitment as a valuable bargaining tool despite the risk of impasse. More recently, Kambe (1999) showed that the delays caused by reputation-building discourage negotiators from making incompatible demands. We highlight two factors that influence the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of commitment attempts: a correlation in their successes and public signals about the resolve of negotiators. We show that negotiators make incompatible demands when the correlation is sufficiently negative or the public signals are sufficiently precise, helping to explain common behavior in political negotiations and collective bargaining.

主讲人介绍：

Hulya Eraslan is the Ralph O'Connor Professor of Economics at Rice University, a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Specially Appointed Professor at the Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of Osaka. She received her PhD in 2001 from the University of Minnesota. Previously she held positions at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and Johns Hopkins University. Her areas of research interest include political economy, bargaining and voting theory and their application. She has published numerous articles in leading economics journals, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, and the Review of Economic Studies. She is an elected fellow of the Game Theory Society and an elected fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. She holds editorial positions at Econometrica, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Review of Economic Design and Social Choice and Welfare.