时间：5月22日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主讲人：虎高计（上海财经大学经济学院副教授）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

题目: The Structure of Bayesian Stable Matchings

摘要：Stability is a central concept in matching theory, and the structure of the stable matching set has important welfare implications. This paper examines a Bayesian matching model that accommodates both complete and incomplete information. We first demonstrate how fundamental structural results---namely, the celebrated Lone Wolf Theorem and Lattice Theorem---may fail under incomplete information. We then identify natural conditions under which these results can be restored in the general setting. Our key condition, termed common information, encompasses complete information as a special case, thereby uncovering the informational assumption underlying the classic theorems. Furthermore, we analyze additional welfare properties of stable matchings related to these two theorems and extend our main results to the belief-free incomplete-information setting.

主讲人介绍：Gaoji Hu is an associate professor of economics (tenured) at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. He holds a Ph.D. from the National University of Singapore. His research interests include matching/market design, mechanism design, information design, and revealed preference analysis. His work has been published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Theoretical Economics, etc. He also serves as an Associate Editor for the Journal of Mathematical Economics.