时间：11月21日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主讲人：高步渠（湖南大学经济与贸易学院助理教授）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

题目: Designing Interim Deadlines for Time-Inconsistent Agents

摘要：In many real-life situations, people need to complete a divisible task over a fixed time horizon. There are two prominent features in task management. First, people are subject to productivity shocks, which requires flexibility in intertemporal workload allocation. Second, people are prone to procrastination and demand commitment devices. In a principal-agent setting, we study the optimal design of interim deadlines that trade off the demand for flexibility and commitment. We show that the profit-maximizing contract may entail fewer interim deadlines for the time-inconsistent agent than for the time-consistent agent. Moreover, relative to the welfare-maximizing contract, the profit-maximizing contract may give more autonomy to the agent.

主讲人介绍：高步渠，湖南大学经济与贸易学院助理教授，博士毕业于波士顿大学经济学专业，研究领域为产业组织、行为经济学、应用微观理论，主要关注市场与组织内部的合约设计，研究成果发表于Management Science.