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环境与能源经济学workshop：Hybrid Contracts, Multitasking, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence from China's Air Pollution Controls
发布日期：2024-04-19 12:00 来源：
环境与能源经济学讲座：Hybrid Contracts, Multitasking, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence from China's Air Pollution Controls
主讲人：曹光宇（北京大学经济学院）
时间：2024年4月19日（周五）上午10:00-12:00（北京时间）
地点：北京大学承泽园249教室
摘要：
This paper examines how local Chinese officials respond to hybrid incentive contracts combining minimum standards for air pollution controls and high-powered incentives for economic growth. Using a novel prefecture-day level dataset on air quality and applying a regression discontinuity design, we find strong evidence that air quality tends to improve when the air quality target is doomed to fail but deteriorates significantly after the early fulfillment of the target is guaranteed. For those cities facing a higher pressure of local economic development, the improvement after doomed failure will be weakened while the deterioration after early fulfillment will be aggravated. We build a simple theoretical model to rationalize these key findings and further take officials' intrinsic motivations and political incentives into consideration. Our study sheds light on how hybrid contracts function in a multitasking context.
主讲人简介：
曹光宇，北京大学经济学院财政学系助理教授。他的研究兴趣主要集中在数字经济和公共经济学领域。研究论文发表于Journal of Public Economics、RAND Journal of Economics、《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内外知名期刊。
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首页
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环境与能源经济学workshop：Hybrid Contracts, Multitasking, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence from China's Air Pollution Controls
发布日期：2024-04-19 12:00 来源：
环境与能源经济学讲座：Hybrid Contracts, Multitasking, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence from China's Air Pollution Controls
主讲人：曹光宇（北京大学经济学院）
时间：2024年4月19日（周五）上午10:00-12:00（北京时间）
地点：北京大学承泽园249教室
摘要：
This paper examines how local Chinese officials respond to hybrid incentive contracts combining minimum standards for air pollution controls and high-powered incentives for economic growth. Using a novel prefecture-day level dataset on air quality and applying a regression discontinuity design, we find strong evidence that air quality tends to improve when the air quality target is doomed to fail but deteriorates significantly after the early fulfillment of the target is guaranteed. For those cities facing a higher pressure of local economic development, the improvement after doomed failure will be weakened while the deterioration after early fulfillment will be aggravated. We build a simple theoretical model to rationalize these key findings and further take officials' intrinsic motivations and political incentives into consideration. Our study sheds light on how hybrid contracts function in a multitasking context.
主讲人简介：
曹光宇，北京大学经济学院财政学系助理教授。他的研究兴趣主要集中在数字经济和公共经济学领域。研究论文发表于Journal of Public Economics、RAND Journal of Economics、《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内外知名期刊。
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