-
首页
-
- 首页
- WORKSHOP预告
国际经济学workshop: Uncertainty through the Production Network: Evidence from Stock Market Data
发布日期：2024-04-09 12:00 来源：
主讲人：Giacomo Candian（HEC Montréal）
主持人：余昌华（北京大学国家发展研究院）
时间：2024年4月9日（周二）上午9:00-10:30（北京时间）
地点：线上会议
Zoom会议号：926 3889 7210
密码：908060
摘要：
Should exchange rate policy communication be transparent or intentionally opaque? We show that it depends on whether expectations depart from rationality. We develop a macroeconomic model in which agents overreact to their private information about fundamentals and use the exchange rate as a public signal to learn about the private information of others. In this environment, central bank communication surrounding foreign exchange (FX) interventions can influence the information content of the ex- change rate and can be used to “manage expectations.” While FX interventions that are publicly announced provide additional information about fundamentals, secret FX inter- ventions instead alter the informational content of the exchange rate. If the overreaction bias is strong enough, it is optimal to intervene secretly to limit the informativeness of the exchange rate. Our model rationalizes observed practices in exchange rate policies such as managed floats and the opacity surrounding FX interventions.
主讲人介绍：
Giacomo Candian is an Associate Professor of Economics at HEC Montréal and a CIRANO researcher. He holds a Research Professorship in Macroeconomics and International Finance.His research has been published in the Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of International Economics and Review of Economic Dynamics.
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
国际经济学workshop: Uncertainty through the Production Network: Evidence from Stock Market Data
发布日期：2024-04-09 12:00 来源：
主讲人：Giacomo Candian（HEC Montréal）
主持人：余昌华（北京大学国家发展研究院）
时间：2024年4月9日（周二）上午9:00-10:30（北京时间）
地点：线上会议
Zoom会议号：926 3889 7210
密码：908060
摘要：
Should exchange rate policy communication be transparent or intentionally opaque? We show that it depends on whether expectations depart from rationality. We develop a macroeconomic model in which agents overreact to their private information about fundamentals and use the exchange rate as a public signal to learn about the private information of others. In this environment, central bank communication surrounding foreign exchange (FX) interventions can influence the information content of the ex- change rate and can be used to “manage expectations.” While FX interventions that are publicly announced provide additional information about fundamentals, secret FX inter- ventions instead alter the informational content of the exchange rate. If the overreaction bias is strong enough, it is optimal to intervene secretly to limit the informativeness of the exchange rate. Our model rationalizes observed practices in exchange rate policies such as managed floats and the opacity surrounding FX interventions.
主讲人介绍：
Giacomo Candian is an Associate Professor of Economics at HEC Montréal and a CIRANO researcher. He holds a Research Professorship in Macroeconomics and International Finance.His research has been published in the Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of International Economics and Review of Economic Dynamics.
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
