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微观理论workshop: Information Size and Full Implementation
发布日期：2024-03-28 12:00 来源：
时间：3月28日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：孙一飞（对外经济贸易大学教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Information Size and Full Implementation
摘要：The presence of asymmetric information presents significant challenges in designing mechanisms for achieving full implementation. These challenges stem from the exclusivity of private information, whereby agents with access to such information can manipulate their reports to their advantage. McLean and Postlewaite (2002) introduced the concept of information size to quantify the degree of exclusiveness of private information. In this study, we explore the full implementation problem in environments with varying information sizes. We demonstrate that in a special case where no agent can conceal their private information when aggregated with others' true information, full implementation of any social choice can be achieved through a two-stage mechanism in initial rationalizability. Additionally, we analyze the broader conflict and trade-off between the size of private information and the efficiency of achieving full implementation. Our findings underscore the intricate relationship between information asymmetry and mechanism efficiency in addressing asymmetric information scenarios.
主讲人介绍：孙一飞，对外经济贸易大学教授，国家级人才入选者，主要研究领域为博弈论与信息经济学，侧重于机制设计与实施理论，研究成果发表于Journal of Political Economy、Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior等高水平国际期刊，主持并完成国家自然科学基金青年项目一项（结项获评“特优”），面上项目一项，入选2023年中国信息经济学会乌家培资助计划。
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首页
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微观理论workshop: Information Size and Full Implementation
发布日期：2024-03-28 12:00 来源：
时间：3月28日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：孙一飞（对外经济贸易大学教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Information Size and Full Implementation
摘要：The presence of asymmetric information presents significant challenges in designing mechanisms for achieving full implementation. These challenges stem from the exclusivity of private information, whereby agents with access to such information can manipulate their reports to their advantage. McLean and Postlewaite (2002) introduced the concept of information size to quantify the degree of exclusiveness of private information. In this study, we explore the full implementation problem in environments with varying information sizes. We demonstrate that in a special case where no agent can conceal their private information when aggregated with others' true information, full implementation of any social choice can be achieved through a two-stage mechanism in initial rationalizability. Additionally, we analyze the broader conflict and trade-off between the size of private information and the efficiency of achieving full implementation. Our findings underscore the intricate relationship between information asymmetry and mechanism efficiency in addressing asymmetric information scenarios.
主讲人介绍：孙一飞，对外经济贸易大学教授，国家级人才入选者，主要研究领域为博弈论与信息经济学，侧重于机制设计与实施理论，研究成果发表于Journal of Political Economy、Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior等高水平国际期刊，主持并完成国家自然科学基金青年项目一项（结项获评“特优”），面上项目一项，入选2023年中国信息经济学会乌家培资助计划。
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