Toggle topbar
北京大学国家发展研究院

微观理论workshop:Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents

发布日期：2023-06-15 12:00    来源：

时间：6月15日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：经院302

主讲人：魏冬 (Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz)

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）

题目: Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents

摘要：We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and a lack of commitment. A principal who can only commit to one-period contracts would like to screen efficient (i.e., low-cost) workers over time and assign harder tasks to them. After efficiency is revealed, the principal becomes tempted to change the terms of trade. Breaches in contracts are observable and, hence, whenever past promises are not honored future information revelation stops. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the principal is able to foster information revelation. Optimal contracts entail high-powered incentives after information is initially revealed, and rewards for information revelation disappear in the long run. Information revelation becomes easier when workers are stochastically replaced by new ones.

主讲人介绍：Dong Wei is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from UC Berkeley. His current research focuses on information transmission and disclosure in dynamic settings. His research has been published in several peer-reviewed journals, including American Economic Review, AER: Insights, and Games and Economic Behavior.


分享到：
朗润

国家发展研究院官方微信

国家发展研究院官方微信
点击关注点击关注

相关链接

Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用