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劳动与健康经济学workshop：Physicians as Persuaders: Evidence from Hospitals in China
发布日期：2022-12-02 12:00 来源：
时间：2022年12月2日10:00-11:30
会议形式：线上举行（发送邮件至邮箱 xlgao@nsd.pku.edn.cn 获取线上会议信息）
主持人：雷晓燕、易君健
参与老师：赵耀辉、李玲、刘国恩、张丹丹、黄炜
主讲人：向佳，Indiana University
摘要： I apply a Bayesian persuasion framework to study information transmission in the physician-patient relationship. I highlight the role of each party’s financial incentives in determining medical treatment outcomes. I estimate the model using a large database of claims from China, exploiting a policy change with independent sources of random variation in physicians’ and patients’ financial incentives. For a diagnosis for which surgical treatment is somewhat discretionary, fully informing patients, equivalently eliminating physicians’ financial incentives, reduces surgery rates by almost half. This effect is greater when patients are better insured.
主讲人简介：Jia Xiang is an Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State in 2020. She was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Harvard School of Public Health and a member of Harvard China Health Partnership from 2020 to 2021. Her areas of expertise include Industrial Organization, Health Economics, and Applied Microeconomics.
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首页
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劳动与健康经济学workshop：Physicians as Persuaders: Evidence from Hospitals in China
发布日期：2022-12-02 12:00 来源：
时间：2022年12月2日10:00-11:30
会议形式：线上举行（发送邮件至邮箱 xlgao@nsd.pku.edn.cn 获取线上会议信息）
主持人：雷晓燕、易君健
参与老师：赵耀辉、李玲、刘国恩、张丹丹、黄炜
主讲人：向佳，Indiana University
摘要： I apply a Bayesian persuasion framework to study information transmission in the physician-patient relationship. I highlight the role of each party’s financial incentives in determining medical treatment outcomes. I estimate the model using a large database of claims from China, exploiting a policy change with independent sources of random variation in physicians’ and patients’ financial incentives. For a diagnosis for which surgical treatment is somewhat discretionary, fully informing patients, equivalently eliminating physicians’ financial incentives, reduces surgery rates by almost half. This effect is greater when patients are better insured.
主讲人简介：Jia Xiang is an Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State in 2020. She was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Harvard School of Public Health and a member of Harvard China Health Partnership from 2020 to 2021. Her areas of expertise include Industrial Organization, Health Economics, and Applied Microeconomics.
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