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发展经济学workshop：Corrupted meritocracy selection and accountability in bureaucratic politics
发布日期：2022-11-16 12:00 来源：
时间：2022年11月16日(周三)11:30-13:00教室：承泽园245主讲人：罗兆天（芝加哥大学）参与老师：（国发院）李力行，席天扬，徐化愚，于航，王轩，易君健（经院）刘冲，吴群锋，曹光宇论文题目：Corrupted meritocracy selection and accountability in bureaucratic politics论文摘要：Why politically centralized regimes often adopt decentralized fiscal systems We argue that a flexible fiscal system may help central government strike a balance between meritocratic selection and political accountability within the bureaucracy. We propose a model of bureaucratic delegation, in which the central government cares about both the fiscal performance and the selection of competence officials, who have a discretion over the use of the budget. The central government is induced to assign a larger discretionary budget and thus tolerate corruption more when it places a larger emphasis on meritocratic selection. In turn, corruption and meritocratic selection may coexist in equilibrium, and corruption can be identified and punished only ex post. This model has empirical implications for understanding various contexts of bureaucracies, such as administrations, firms, NGOs, and academic entities.主讲人介绍：罗兆天，美国芝加哥大学政治学与政治经济学助理教授，北大国发院访问学者，美国纽约大学政治学博士。研究方向为政治经济学理论与博弈论。在AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, JOURNAL OF POLITICS, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE等期刊上发表多篇学术论文。个人主页： httpwww.luozhaotian.com 我们将为同学们提供午餐，请线下参加workshop并需要订餐的同学点击链接报名：https://www.wjx.cn/vm/Yv fSNA1.aspx 报名截止时间为下周二（11月15日）12:00，请大家报名后尽量参加，避免浪费。
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发展经济学workshop：Corrupted meritocracy selection and accountability in bureaucratic politics
发布日期：2022-11-16 12:00 来源：
时间：2022年11月16日(周三)11:30-13:00教室：承泽园245主讲人：罗兆天（芝加哥大学）参与老师：（国发院）李力行，席天扬，徐化愚，于航，王轩，易君健（经院）刘冲，吴群锋，曹光宇论文题目：Corrupted meritocracy selection and accountability in bureaucratic politics论文摘要：Why politically centralized regimes often adopt decentralized fiscal systems We argue that a flexible fiscal system may help central government strike a balance between meritocratic selection and political accountability within the bureaucracy. We propose a model of bureaucratic delegation, in which the central government cares about both the fiscal performance and the selection of competence officials, who have a discretion over the use of the budget. The central government is induced to assign a larger discretionary budget and thus tolerate corruption more when it places a larger emphasis on meritocratic selection. In turn, corruption and meritocratic selection may coexist in equilibrium, and corruption can be identified and punished only ex post. This model has empirical implications for understanding various contexts of bureaucracies, such as administrations, firms, NGOs, and academic entities.主讲人介绍：罗兆天，美国芝加哥大学政治学与政治经济学助理教授，北大国发院访问学者，美国纽约大学政治学博士。研究方向为政治经济学理论与博弈论。在AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, JOURNAL OF POLITICS, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE等期刊上发表多篇学术论文。个人主页： httpwww.luozhaotian.com 我们将为同学们提供午餐，请线下参加workshop并需要订餐的同学点击链接报名：https://www.wjx.cn/vm/Yv fSNA1.aspx 报名截止时间为下周二（11月15日）12:00，请大家报名后尽量参加，避免浪费。
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