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微观理论workshop：Self-enforcing Power Dynamics
发布日期：2022-10-31 01:12 来源：
时间：11月3日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：经院107
主讲人：罗兆天（美国芝加哥大学政治学与政治经济学助理教授，北大国发院访问助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）
题目: Self-enforcing Power Dynamics
摘要：This paper presents a model of self-enforcing power dynamics between a “ruler” and an “opponent,” in which the power of one side is defined by the probability to defeat the other side in a conflict. The ruler in some states of the world can appropriate all the surplus of the economy and may take steps to increase power, while in other states the ruler faces the opponent’s threat and must share some surplus to avoid conflict. These states evolve probabilistically depending on the current power of the ruler. The question is whether in equilibrium the ruler would share power with the opponent, refraining from further increasing power after gaining a satisfactory level. And, given the implied power dynamics, whether would conflict occur, when, and why.
主讲人介绍：罗兆天，美国芝加哥大学政治学与政治经济学助理教授，北京大学国家发展研究院访问助理教授。美国纽约大学政治学博士，对外经济贸易大学政治学学士。主要研究方向为政治经济学理论与博弈论。在American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Quarterly Journal of Political Science等期刊上发表多篇学术论文。
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微观理论workshop：Self-enforcing Power Dynamics
发布日期：2022-10-31 01:12 来源：
时间：11月3日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：经院107
主讲人：罗兆天（美国芝加哥大学政治学与政治经济学助理教授，北大国发院访问助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）
题目: Self-enforcing Power Dynamics
摘要：This paper presents a model of self-enforcing power dynamics between a “ruler” and an “opponent,” in which the power of one side is defined by the probability to defeat the other side in a conflict. The ruler in some states of the world can appropriate all the surplus of the economy and may take steps to increase power, while in other states the ruler faces the opponent’s threat and must share some surplus to avoid conflict. These states evolve probabilistically depending on the current power of the ruler. The question is whether in equilibrium the ruler would share power with the opponent, refraining from further increasing power after gaining a satisfactory level. And, given the implied power dynamics, whether would conflict occur, when, and why.
主讲人介绍：罗兆天，美国芝加哥大学政治学与政治经济学助理教授，北京大学国家发展研究院访问助理教授。美国纽约大学政治学博士，对外经济贸易大学政治学学士。主要研究方向为政治经济学理论与博弈论。在American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Quarterly Journal of Political Science等期刊上发表多篇学术论文。
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