Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring

时间：5月11日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：经院302教室

主讲人：戴亮（上海交通大学副教授）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）

摘要：We study a principal’s joint design of optimal monitoring and compensation schemes to incentivize an agent by incorporating information design into a dynamic contracting framework. The principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent’s effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent’s continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent’s effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.

主讲人介绍：Liang Dai is an Associate Professor of Economics at Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He obtained his Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University in 2015. His research focuses on applied microeconomic theory, and his work has been published in Journal of Economic Theory.