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sidenav header background[2月23日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2023-02-20 11:36 来源：
Priority Search
时间：2月23日（周四）10.30-12.00
地点：经院302
主讲人：许梦涵（厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院副教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）
摘要：
In a random search framework, agents decide whether to visit the market, thereby forgoing their heterogeneous outside options. Coordination failure in market entry leads to congestion. We address the overparticipation issue by introducing a priority search program, which facilitates expedited matching in the market by charging a priority service fee. It naturally raises market entry costs and hence mitigates congestion. We establish that a profit-maximizing priority search program induces the socially optimal level of market participation. Additionally, priority search is superior to conventional intervention via the pricing scheme, which overcorrects the congestion problem and results in underparticipation. Our results are robust to several market design details and have important implications for regulating congested markets such as medical resource rationing and ride hailing.
主讲人介绍：
许梦涵，厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院副教授。加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校经济学博士，研究领域为微观经济理论、机制设计、产业组织理论等。主要研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Industrial Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等国际学术期刊上。曾作为项目负责人承担国家自然科学基金、教育部人文社科等项目。
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[2月23日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2023-02-20 11:36 来源：
Priority Search
时间：2月23日（周四）10.30-12.00
地点：经院302
主讲人：许梦涵（厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院副教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）
摘要：
In a random search framework, agents decide whether to visit the market, thereby forgoing their heterogeneous outside options. Coordination failure in market entry leads to congestion. We address the overparticipation issue by introducing a priority search program, which facilitates expedited matching in the market by charging a priority service fee. It naturally raises market entry costs and hence mitigates congestion. We establish that a profit-maximizing priority search program induces the socially optimal level of market participation. Additionally, priority search is superior to conventional intervention via the pricing scheme, which overcorrects the congestion problem and results in underparticipation. Our results are robust to several market design details and have important implications for regulating congested markets such as medical resource rationing and ride hailing.
主讲人介绍：
许梦涵，厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院副教授。加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校经济学博士，研究领域为微观经济理论、机制设计、产业组织理论等。主要研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Industrial Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等国际学术期刊上。曾作为项目负责人承担国家自然科学基金、教育部人文社科等项目。
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