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sidenav header background[11月2日] 发展和政治经济学Workshop
发布日期：2022-10-26 05:14 来源：
Reciprocity in political networks: Hometown ties and intercity investment in China时间：2022年11月2日(周三)11:30-13:00参与方式：仅线上，腾讯会议号：845-9894-4759主讲人：刘宇（复旦大学）参与老师：（国发院）李力行，席天扬，徐化愚，于航，王轩，易君健（光华） 张晓波（经院） 刘冲，吴群锋，曹光宇论文摘要：We employ a unique dataset on Chinese firm registration to examine how hometown ties in political networks affect capital allocation. We use a quasi-experimental design that relies on the relocation of officials across Chinese cities. The results indicate that hometown ties between city party secretaries increase city-dyad investment by 10% and firm registrations by 1%. They also suggest the effects are greater between distant city pairs and stronger for investment by small firms. Additionally, entering firms survive for a longer time. Comparing the effects before and after the Chinese anti-corruption campaign, we provide suggestive evidence that these results reveal the rent-seeking activity by officials.主讲人简介：刘宇，复旦大学经济学院副教授，主要研究方向是发展经济学和公共经济学。文章发表在Journal of International Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance，在复旦大学教授微观经济学，发展经济学，以及全球化与中国三门课程。
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sidenav header background[11月2日] 发展和政治经济学Workshop
发布日期：2022-10-26 05:14 来源：
Reciprocity in political networks: Hometown ties and intercity investment in China时间：2022年11月2日(周三)11:30-13:00参与方式：仅线上，腾讯会议号：845-9894-4759主讲人：刘宇（复旦大学）参与老师：（国发院）李力行，席天扬，徐化愚，于航，王轩，易君健（光华） 张晓波（经院） 刘冲，吴群锋，曹光宇论文摘要：We employ a unique dataset on Chinese firm registration to examine how hometown ties in political networks affect capital allocation. We use a quasi-experimental design that relies on the relocation of officials across Chinese cities. The results indicate that hometown ties between city party secretaries increase city-dyad investment by 10% and firm registrations by 1%. They also suggest the effects are greater between distant city pairs and stronger for investment by small firms. Additionally, entering firms survive for a longer time. Comparing the effects before and after the Chinese anti-corruption campaign, we provide suggestive evidence that these results reveal the rent-seeking activity by officials.主讲人简介：刘宇，复旦大学经济学院副教授，主要研究方向是发展经济学和公共经济学。文章发表在Journal of International Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance，在复旦大学教授微观经济学，发展经济学，以及全球化与中国三门课程。
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