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sidenav header background[10月6日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2022-09-30 01:44 来源：
Information Design with Image Concerns（兼顾形象考量的信息设计）
时间：10月6日（周四）上午10:30 -12:00
地点：经院107
主讲人：刘烁（北京大学光华管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）
摘要：In many economic situations, a sender communicates strategically with a receiver not only to influence the decision-making of the latter, but also how certain intrinsic characteristics of herself (e.g. selfishness, integrity) are perceived by the latter. To study such strategic interactions, we introduce image concerns to the canonical framework of information design. Our main result characterizes how the sender optimally sacrifices her material utilities to boost reputation by manipulating the communication protocol of a payoff-relevant state. The presence of image concerns may increase or decrease the receiver's welfare, and its effect can be non-monotone. Our analysis provides new insights into various applications, such as how performance evaluation in organizations can backfire by engendering harmful signalling, or the use and misuse of populist rhetoric in political elections.
主讲人介绍：刘烁，北京大学光华管理学院应用经济学系助理教授。2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获博士学位。目前主要研究领域为产业与组织经济学，博弈论，以及机制设计理论。研究成果发表于国际知名学术期刊，如Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review等。 目前主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“市场竞争与有限理性消费者”，并参与重大项目“数字经济反垄断理论与政策研究”。
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[10月6日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2022-09-30 01:44 来源：
Information Design with Image Concerns（兼顾形象考量的信息设计）
时间：10月6日（周四）上午10:30 -12:00
地点：经院107
主讲人：刘烁（北京大学光华管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华）
摘要：In many economic situations, a sender communicates strategically with a receiver not only to influence the decision-making of the latter, but also how certain intrinsic characteristics of herself (e.g. selfishness, integrity) are perceived by the latter. To study such strategic interactions, we introduce image concerns to the canonical framework of information design. Our main result characterizes how the sender optimally sacrifices her material utilities to boost reputation by manipulating the communication protocol of a payoff-relevant state. The presence of image concerns may increase or decrease the receiver's welfare, and its effect can be non-monotone. Our analysis provides new insights into various applications, such as how performance evaluation in organizations can backfire by engendering harmful signalling, or the use and misuse of populist rhetoric in political elections.
主讲人介绍：刘烁，北京大学光华管理学院应用经济学系助理教授。2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获博士学位。目前主要研究领域为产业与组织经济学，博弈论，以及机制设计理论。研究成果发表于国际知名学术期刊，如Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review等。 目前主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“市场竞争与有限理性消费者”，并参与重大项目“数字经济反垄断理论与政策研究”。
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