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sidenav header background[3月31日]博士后workshop
发布日期：2022-03-28 10:24 来源：
博士后workshop（第8期）：
Window Dressing in the Public Sector:
Evidence from China’s Compulsory Education Promotion Program时间：2022年3月31日（周四）14:00 —15:30
地点：承泽园131教室
报告摘要：
We examine the window dressing behaviors of China’s local governments when they were imposed the targets of compulsory education by the central government in the 1990s. The fulfillment of the targets was to be certified by the inspections of the higher-level government, and a failure would have severe negative career consequences for the county leaders. We find that county-level educational expenditures saw a sharp drop immediately after the inspection and interpret this phenomenon as evidence for county governments’ window dressing behaviors. Further analysis suggests that local officials with a longer tenure in the current position, who were more eager to seek for political promotion, window-dressed more aggressively. The window dressing behaviors generate explicit distributional consequences: junior high school enrollment rates declined significantly after the inspection, and rural citizens bore the blunt of the decline in school enrollment. Children exposed to local governments’ window-dressing behavior recorded poorer later-life outcomes, including a lower probability of graduating from junior high school and lower average monthly wages in 2005, which indicates a possible deterioration in education quality.
主讲人简介：
刘畅，经济学博士，中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院助理教授。研究成果发表于Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Law, Economics & Organization、Journal of Comparative Economics、European Journal of Political Economy等英文SSCI刊物以及《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》等中文核心期刊。
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教学项目展开 / 收起
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sidenav header background[3月31日]博士后workshop
发布日期：2022-03-28 10:24 来源：
博士后workshop（第8期）：
Window Dressing in the Public Sector:
Evidence from China’s Compulsory Education Promotion Program时间：2022年3月31日（周四）14:00 —15:30
地点：承泽园131教室
报告摘要：
We examine the window dressing behaviors of China’s local governments when they were imposed the targets of compulsory education by the central government in the 1990s. The fulfillment of the targets was to be certified by the inspections of the higher-level government, and a failure would have severe negative career consequences for the county leaders. We find that county-level educational expenditures saw a sharp drop immediately after the inspection and interpret this phenomenon as evidence for county governments’ window dressing behaviors. Further analysis suggests that local officials with a longer tenure in the current position, who were more eager to seek for political promotion, window-dressed more aggressively. The window dressing behaviors generate explicit distributional consequences: junior high school enrollment rates declined significantly after the inspection, and rural citizens bore the blunt of the decline in school enrollment. Children exposed to local governments’ window-dressing behavior recorded poorer later-life outcomes, including a lower probability of graduating from junior high school and lower average monthly wages in 2005, which indicates a possible deterioration in education quality.
主讲人简介：
刘畅，经济学博士，中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院助理教授。研究成果发表于Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Law, Economics & Organization、Journal of Comparative Economics、European Journal of Political Economy等英文SSCI刊物以及《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》等中文核心期刊。
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