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sidenav header background[11月2日] 国际经济学Workshop
发布日期：2021-10-25 10:44 来源：
Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
时间：2021年11月02日（周二）20:00-21:30
主持人：余淼杰、余昌华
主讲人：Javier Bianchi
加入Zoom会议：https://zoom.com.cn/j/92638897210?pwd=d1pkemQ3d2MrSmZLNzJmTzdCOCtBUT09
会议号：926 3889 7210
密码：908060
摘要：We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors’ confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs.
主讲人简介：Javier Bianchi currently works as a Senior Research Economist in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. His major areas of interests are in international macroeconomics, macroeconomics, and macro-finance. His work has been published in several leading journals, including the American Economic Review, the Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Review of Economic Studies, and the Journal of International Economics, In 2016-2017, he was the recipient of Excellence in Refereeing Award from American Economic Review. Now, he is the co-editor of the Journal of International Economics.
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[11月2日] 国际经济学Workshop
发布日期：2021-10-25 10:44 来源：
Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
时间：2021年11月02日（周二）20:00-21:30
主持人：余淼杰、余昌华
主讲人：Javier Bianchi
加入Zoom会议：https://zoom.com.cn/j/92638897210?pwd=d1pkemQ3d2MrSmZLNzJmTzdCOCtBUT09
会议号：926 3889 7210
密码：908060
摘要：We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors’ confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs.
主讲人简介：Javier Bianchi currently works as a Senior Research Economist in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. His major areas of interests are in international macroeconomics, macroeconomics, and macro-finance. His work has been published in several leading journals, including the American Economic Review, the Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Review of Economic Studies, and the Journal of International Economics, In 2016-2017, he was the recipient of Excellence in Refereeing Award from American Economic Review. Now, he is the co-editor of the Journal of International Economics.
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