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sidenav header background[11月14日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2019-11-13 03:49 来源：
微观理论Workshop:
Implementing Optimal Mechanisms Through Sequential Auctions
时 间：2019年11月14日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303会议室
主讲人：石凡奇
组织人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
题 目：Implementing Optimal Mechanisms Through Sequential Auctions
摘 要：We study the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. The valuation of each item depends on a buyer's private type and an item-specific characteristic (e.g. quality). We assume “generalized vertical differentiation”, i.e. valuations of all items increase in buyers’ types. In this setting, it is optimal to sell items in decreasing level of quality: it achieves full efficiency if valuations exhibit strict increasing differences (SID) in item quality and buyers’ types. In addition, when reserve prices are allowed, sequential auctions with the above-mentioned order and optimal single-item reserve prices maximize the seller's revenue among all mechanisms that satisfy (BIC) and (IIR). We show both efficiency and revenue-maximization are robust to auction formats, such as sequential first-price, second-price, and English auctions. Our analysis shows that a properly ordered sequential auction is an optimal indirect selling mechanism, providing justification for its wide real-life applications.
主讲人介绍：石凡奇，北京大学经济学院经济系助理教授，2019年6月毕业于美国斯坦福大学。主要研究方向包括微观理论，机制和市场设计。
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[11月14日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2019-11-13 03:49 来源：
微观理论Workshop:
Implementing Optimal Mechanisms Through Sequential Auctions
时 间：2019年11月14日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303会议室
主讲人：石凡奇
组织人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
题 目：Implementing Optimal Mechanisms Through Sequential Auctions
摘 要：We study the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. The valuation of each item depends on a buyer's private type and an item-specific characteristic (e.g. quality). We assume “generalized vertical differentiation”, i.e. valuations of all items increase in buyers’ types. In this setting, it is optimal to sell items in decreasing level of quality: it achieves full efficiency if valuations exhibit strict increasing differences (SID) in item quality and buyers’ types. In addition, when reserve prices are allowed, sequential auctions with the above-mentioned order and optimal single-item reserve prices maximize the seller's revenue among all mechanisms that satisfy (BIC) and (IIR). We show both efficiency and revenue-maximization are robust to auction formats, such as sequential first-price, second-price, and English auctions. Our analysis shows that a properly ordered sequential auction is an optimal indirect selling mechanism, providing justification for its wide real-life applications.
主讲人介绍：石凡奇，北京大学经济学院经济系助理教授，2019年6月毕业于美国斯坦福大学。主要研究方向包括微观理论，机制和市场设计。
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