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sidenav header background[5月28日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2019-05-27 05:30 来源：
Information Structure and Price Competition
时 间：2019年5月28日（周二）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院301小教室
主讲人：Jidong Zhou
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Information Structure and Price Competitions
摘 要：
This paper studies how product information possessed by consumers (e.g. from product reviews, platform recommendations, etc.) affects competition between firms. We consider symmetric firms which supply differentiated products and compete in prices. Before purchase, consumers observe a private signal of their valuations for various products. For example, the signal might reveal their valuations perfectly or not at all, or only inform them of the ranking of products. We consider a fairly general class of signal structures which induce a symmetric pure-strategy pricing equilibrium, and derive for the signal structure within this class which is optimal for firm or for consumers. The key trade-off is that with more detailed product information consumers are more able to buy their preferred products, but at the same time firms have more market power and charge higher prices. The firm-optimal signal structure induces consumers to view the products as being sufficiently differentiated, while the consumer-optimal information structure induces choosy consumers to buy their preferred product but pools other consumers by providing little information to them in order to intensify price competition. The firm-optimal information structure often does not cause mismatch between consumers and products and so maximizes total welfare, while the consumer-optimal information structure often causes mismatch and does not maximize total welfare. We also derive an upper bound for consumer surplus across all symmetric information structures, which shows that allowing for mixed-strategy pricing equilibria could increase consumer surplus only slightly.
主讲人介绍：
Jidong Zhou is an assistant professor of economics at Yale School of Management. His research fields include applied microeconomic theory, industrial organization, and behavioral economics. His research mainly examines how imperfect information and imperfect consumer abilities hinder market competition and harm market efficiency, and their implications for antitrust and consumer-protection policies. He has published his research in journals like American Economic Review, Econometrica, RAND Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies. He serves as an associate editor for several journals including RAND Journal of Economics. Jidong Zhou received a B.A. in Management and Economics and an M.A. in Economics from Guanghua School of Management in Peking University, and a Ph.D. in Economics from University College London.
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[5月28日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2019-05-27 05:30 来源：
Information Structure and Price Competition
时 间：2019年5月28日（周二）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院301小教室
主讲人：Jidong Zhou
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Information Structure and Price Competitions
摘 要：
This paper studies how product information possessed by consumers (e.g. from product reviews, platform recommendations, etc.) affects competition between firms. We consider symmetric firms which supply differentiated products and compete in prices. Before purchase, consumers observe a private signal of their valuations for various products. For example, the signal might reveal their valuations perfectly or not at all, or only inform them of the ranking of products. We consider a fairly general class of signal structures which induce a symmetric pure-strategy pricing equilibrium, and derive for the signal structure within this class which is optimal for firm or for consumers. The key trade-off is that with more detailed product information consumers are more able to buy their preferred products, but at the same time firms have more market power and charge higher prices. The firm-optimal signal structure induces consumers to view the products as being sufficiently differentiated, while the consumer-optimal information structure induces choosy consumers to buy their preferred product but pools other consumers by providing little information to them in order to intensify price competition. The firm-optimal information structure often does not cause mismatch between consumers and products and so maximizes total welfare, while the consumer-optimal information structure often causes mismatch and does not maximize total welfare. We also derive an upper bound for consumer surplus across all symmetric information structures, which shows that allowing for mixed-strategy pricing equilibria could increase consumer surplus only slightly.
主讲人介绍：
Jidong Zhou is an assistant professor of economics at Yale School of Management. His research fields include applied microeconomic theory, industrial organization, and behavioral economics. His research mainly examines how imperfect information and imperfect consumer abilities hinder market competition and harm market efficiency, and their implications for antitrust and consumer-protection policies. He has published his research in journals like American Economic Review, Econometrica, RAND Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies. He serves as an associate editor for several journals including RAND Journal of Economics. Jidong Zhou received a B.A. in Management and Economics and an M.A. in Economics from Guanghua School of Management in Peking University, and a Ph.D. in Economics from University College London.
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