Game Theory ccer, Peking University
 
Professors  Ping, xin-qiao. (Room 503, CCER, Tel. 62754798
                                    E-mail: xqping@ccer.edu.cn.)
 
Fall  2007
 
Textbooks
1. Osborne and Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994.
[Primary]
2. Fudenberg and Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1991. [Primary]
3. Ross Cressman, Evolutionart Dynamics and Extensive Form Games The MIT press, 2003.
4. Frnak Stahler, Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour, EE Press, 1998.
 
Games and Economic Behavior articles (1993-, vol. 5-) in the list are downloadable from
the journal website: http://www.apnet.com/www/journal/ga.htm
Journal of Economic Theory articles (1993-, vol. 59-) in the list are downloadable from
the journal website: http://www.academicpress.com/jet
Articles before 1997 in Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies or Quarterly Journal
of Economics are downloadable from JSTOR: http://www tor.org/
Grading
 
Grade Policy:
There will be approximately three problem sets (30%); a presentation(30%), a take-home final exam (40%).
 
Tentative Outline
1. 9/18  Basic notions (Simultaneous action games: Dominance, Nash equilibrium,
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Extensive form
games with perfect information: Nash equilibrium, Sequential rationality,
Backwards induction, Subgame perfection) [H]
*Osborne and Rubinstein Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 6, 12.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 1, 2, 3, 8.
 
2. 9/25 Bargaining with complete information [H]
*Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap 7.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 4.
Rubinstein, A. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,”
Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
 
3. 10/9 Extensive form games with imperfect information, Sequential equilibrium,
and Forward Induction [H]
*Osborne and Rubinstein Chaps. 11, 12.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 8, 11.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50,
863-894.
 
4. 10/16 Signaling and Reputation formation [H]
*Osborne and Rubinstein Chaps. 12.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps 8, 9, 11.
Cho, I.-K. and D. Kreps (1987) “Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179-221.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Reputation and Imperfect Information,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279.
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), “Predation, reputation and entry deterrence,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982) “Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 27, 245-52.
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1989), "Reputation and Equilibrium
Selection in Games with a Patient Player", Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
 
5. 10/23 Bargaining with incomplete information [H]
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 10.
*Gul, F, H. Sonnenschein, & Robert Wilson (1986), “Foundations of
Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 39, 155-90.
Abreu, D. & F. Gul (2000), “Bargaining and Reputation,” Econometrica,
68, 85-117.
 
6.  10/30  Supermodular Games and their applications [M]
*Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990) “Rationalizability and Learning in
Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, 58, 1255-1277.
*Vives (2005): “Complementarities and Games: New Developments”.
*Topkis, D. M. (1998) Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton.
 
7.  11/6-13  Global Games and their applications [M]
*"Global Games: Theory and Applications," in Advances in Economics
and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the
Econometric Society), edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S.
Turnovsky. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (2003).
*Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993): "Global Games and Equilibrium
Selection," Econometrica, 61, 989-1018.
*Morris, S. and H. Shin "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling
Attacks," American Economic Review 88 (1998), 587-597.
 
8. 11/20-12/17.  Preseantations