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[12月2日] 劳动与健康经济学Workshop

发布日期:2022-11-28 10:53    来源:

Physicians as Persuaders: Evidence from Hospitals in China



会议形式:线上举行(发送自我简介至邮箱 获取线上会议信息)



主讲人:向佳Indiana University)


摘要:I apply a Bayesian persuasion framework to study information transmission in the physician-patient relationship. I highlight the role of each party’s financial incentives in determining medical treatment outcomes. I estimate the model using a large database of claims from China, exploiting a policy change with independent sources of random variation in physicians’ and patients’ financial incentives. For a diagnosis for which surgical treatment is somewhat discretionary, fully informing patients, equivalently eliminating physicians’ financial incentives, reduces surgery rates by almost half. This effect is greater when patients are better insured.


主讲人简介:Jia Xiang is an Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State in 2020. She was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Harvard School of Public Health and a member of Harvard China Health Partnership from 2020 to 2021. Her areas of expertise include Industrial Organization, Health Economics, and Applied Microeconomics.