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sidenav header background[11月4日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2021-11-02 02:01 来源：
主讲人: Roland Strausz (Professor, Hamboldt University of Berlin)
主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠
参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠
题目: Correlation-Savvy Sellers
时间：2021年11月4日（周四）16:00-17:30
地点：ZOOM会议（会议号：926 7582 6417 会议密码：791076）
报告摘要：
We consider a multi-product monopolist who sells her products sequentially to a buyer with privately known valuations. Using big data, the monopolist perfectly learns the intertemporal correlations of the buyer's valuations. Despite her perfect learning, perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable--even under full commitment, because of an informational externality between the consumer's initial valuation and the correlation structure. This complementarity implies that, despite the seller's perfect knowledge of correlations, the buyer's private information about his initial valuation yields him information rents also for his later consumption. Upward distortions are a robust feature of the resulting monopolistic distortions and their presence are non-monotonic in the seller's data-mining abilities.
主讲人简介：
Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany. His research interests is contract theory, mechanism design and industrial organization.
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[11月4日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2021-11-02 02:01 来源：
主讲人: Roland Strausz (Professor, Hamboldt University of Berlin)
主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠
参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠
题目: Correlation-Savvy Sellers
时间：2021年11月4日（周四）16:00-17:30
地点：ZOOM会议（会议号：926 7582 6417 会议密码：791076）
报告摘要：
We consider a multi-product monopolist who sells her products sequentially to a buyer with privately known valuations. Using big data, the monopolist perfectly learns the intertemporal correlations of the buyer's valuations. Despite her perfect learning, perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable--even under full commitment, because of an informational externality between the consumer's initial valuation and the correlation structure. This complementarity implies that, despite the seller's perfect knowledge of correlations, the buyer's private information about his initial valuation yields him information rents also for his later consumption. Upward distortions are a robust feature of the resulting monopolistic distortions and their presence are non-monotonic in the seller's data-mining abilities.
主讲人简介：
Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany. His research interests is contract theory, mechanism design and industrial organization.
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