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sidenav header background[10月29日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2021-10-25 10:37 来源：
Hiring Managers
主讲人: 柯荣住（浙江大学特聘教授）
主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠
参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠
题目: Hiring Managers
时间：2021年10月29日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点：线上（腾讯会议）
会议 ID：808 570 107
会议密码：213456报告摘要：Hiring is pivotal for every organization, and hiring managers are of great importance. Yet it is difficult to design incentive schemes for them to hire better candidates. It is also challenging to measure their performance in hiring. We develop a simple model of principal—hiring manager—candidates to capture their strategic discretion at the hiring stage. A hiring manager’s private incentives induce him to increase screening efforts, which not only benefits himself but also paradoxically benefits the principal by generating the least distorted sorting outcome. To substantiate this theoretical prediction, we use a historical dataset of 12,752 candidates who passed 46 civil service examinations (CSEs) in China between 1400 and 1580. This is the historical equivalent of job screening for the most desirable positions of that period—bureaucrats of imperial court in Ming Dynasty (1360-1644). In our empirical setting, the principal is an emperor, hiring managers are high-level bureaucrat who served as ad hoc examiners, and candidates are men who aimed to join the bureaucracy through passing the CSEs. Empirical results show that an examiner, when assessing candidates who were near the pass/fail borderline, tended to pass those from his home province. This regional favoritism, however, can generate benefits for the principal under certain conditions. To play this type of regional favorites required the examiner to increase his screening effort, which led to superior post-hiring performance of the entire cohort of successful candidates he hired (vis-à-vis the lack of strategic discretion).
主讲人简介：
柯荣住，麻省理工学院经济学博士，浙江大学“文科领军人才”特聘教授，博士生导师。研究领域为微观经济学、契约理论及组织经济学。目前已在Journal of Labor Economics, Operations Research, Theoretical Economics，Management Science等国际权威经济管理专业杂志上等发表文章。也曾在《中国社会科学季刊》(香港)、《中国社会科学评论》(香港)、《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学季刊》等权威中文杂志上发表20多篇文章。曾主持香港政府研究局、浙江省社科办等资助的课题多项；曾参与国家自然科学基金项目、杰出青年科学基金项目，教育部重点课题，浙江省社会科学重大课题，国家体改办体改研究会等研究项目10多项。
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[10月29日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2021-10-25 10:37 来源：
Hiring Managers
主讲人: 柯荣住（浙江大学特聘教授）
主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠
参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠
题目: Hiring Managers
时间：2021年10月29日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点：线上（腾讯会议）
会议 ID：808 570 107
会议密码：213456报告摘要：Hiring is pivotal for every organization, and hiring managers are of great importance. Yet it is difficult to design incentive schemes for them to hire better candidates. It is also challenging to measure their performance in hiring. We develop a simple model of principal—hiring manager—candidates to capture their strategic discretion at the hiring stage. A hiring manager’s private incentives induce him to increase screening efforts, which not only benefits himself but also paradoxically benefits the principal by generating the least distorted sorting outcome. To substantiate this theoretical prediction, we use a historical dataset of 12,752 candidates who passed 46 civil service examinations (CSEs) in China between 1400 and 1580. This is the historical equivalent of job screening for the most desirable positions of that period—bureaucrats of imperial court in Ming Dynasty (1360-1644). In our empirical setting, the principal is an emperor, hiring managers are high-level bureaucrat who served as ad hoc examiners, and candidates are men who aimed to join the bureaucracy through passing the CSEs. Empirical results show that an examiner, when assessing candidates who were near the pass/fail borderline, tended to pass those from his home province. This regional favoritism, however, can generate benefits for the principal under certain conditions. To play this type of regional favorites required the examiner to increase his screening effort, which led to superior post-hiring performance of the entire cohort of successful candidates he hired (vis-à-vis the lack of strategic discretion).
主讲人简介：
柯荣住，麻省理工学院经济学博士，浙江大学“文科领军人才”特聘教授，博士生导师。研究领域为微观经济学、契约理论及组织经济学。目前已在Journal of Labor Economics, Operations Research, Theoretical Economics，Management Science等国际权威经济管理专业杂志上等发表文章。也曾在《中国社会科学季刊》(香港)、《中国社会科学评论》(香港)、《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学季刊》等权威中文杂志上发表20多篇文章。曾主持香港政府研究局、浙江省社科办等资助的课题多项；曾参与国家自然科学基金项目、杰出青年科学基金项目，教育部重点课题，浙江省社会科学重大课题，国家体改办体改研究会等研究项目10多项。
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