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sidenav header background[10月24日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2019-10-22 03:09 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation: Information Design in Coordination Games
时 间：2019年10月24日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院301会议室
主讲人：赵墨非
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目： Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation: Information Design in Coordination Games
摘 要：We study information design in a regime change context. A continuum of agents choose independently whether to attack the current regime and will succeed if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. The strength is uncertain with continuous support, and the information designer designs and commits to a strength-dependent signal. We characterize the optimal information design under an unrestricted configuration where the signal can be arbitrary including public, private and discriminatory information disclosure. At optimum, the information designer randomizes between partial truth-telling and local exaggeration across agents: some agents receive a signal matching the true strength of the status quo, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. Optimal local obfuscation always dominates optimal public signals, and in certain cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation still guarantees the status quo's survival.
主讲人介绍：
赵墨非，首都经贸大学国际经管学院副教授，毕业于UCLA经济系。主要研究方向为微观理论和IO，研究问题包括information design, dynamics of incentives, repeated games等。
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[10月24日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2019-10-22 03:09 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation: Information Design in Coordination Games
时 间：2019年10月24日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院301会议室
主讲人：赵墨非
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目： Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation: Information Design in Coordination Games
摘 要：We study information design in a regime change context. A continuum of agents choose independently whether to attack the current regime and will succeed if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. The strength is uncertain with continuous support, and the information designer designs and commits to a strength-dependent signal. We characterize the optimal information design under an unrestricted configuration where the signal can be arbitrary including public, private and discriminatory information disclosure. At optimum, the information designer randomizes between partial truth-telling and local exaggeration across agents: some agents receive a signal matching the true strength of the status quo, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. Optimal local obfuscation always dominates optimal public signals, and in certain cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation still guarantees the status quo's survival.
主讲人介绍：
赵墨非，首都经贸大学国际经管学院副教授，毕业于UCLA经济系。主要研究方向为微观理论和IO，研究问题包括information design, dynamics of incentives, repeated games等。
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