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sidenav header background[5月9日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2019-05-07 05:52 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Optimal Rank-Order Contest
时 间：2019年5月9日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人：Bin Liu（CUHK Shenzhen）
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Optimal Rank-Order Contest
摘 要：
This paper studies the effort-maximizing contest where N(≥2) contestants' abilities are their private information and the contest organizer has a fixed budget V(>0) to allocate as prizes based on ranks of players' effort. We find that the optimal prize allocation must involve negative prizes and the prize profile must be contingent on the number of entrants. Suppose negative prizes are bounded below by -K<0. There exists a finite K*>0, such that when K≥K*, the optimal contest is an all-pay auction with entry fee K*: The highest bidder wins V plus all entry fees collected if all participate; otherwise, all entrants share equally V and the entry fees. When K<K*, there exists a cutoff integer n*(K), weakly increasing in K, such that the optimal contest is an all-pay auction with entry fee K: When there are more than n*(K) entrants, the highest bidder wins V and all entry fees; when there are less than n*(K) entrants, all entrants share equally V and the entry fees; when exactly n*(K) bidders enter, the highest bidder wins a prize weakly smaller than V plus the entry fees and all others share equally the rest. In particular, when K is relatively small, the optimum is a winner-take-all all-pay auction with entry fee K, in which the highest bidder wins V plus all entry fees collected, regardless of the number of entrants.
主讲人介绍：
Bin Liu is currently an assistant professor at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. His research interests include mechanism design, auctions and contests, and industrial organization. His work appears in International Economic Review , Journal of Economic Theory , the RAND Journal of Economics, among others.
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[5月9日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2019-05-07 05:52 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Optimal Rank-Order Contest
时 间：2019年5月9日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人：Bin Liu（CUHK Shenzhen）
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Optimal Rank-Order Contest
摘 要：
This paper studies the effort-maximizing contest where N(≥2) contestants' abilities are their private information and the contest organizer has a fixed budget V(>0) to allocate as prizes based on ranks of players' effort. We find that the optimal prize allocation must involve negative prizes and the prize profile must be contingent on the number of entrants. Suppose negative prizes are bounded below by -K<0. There exists a finite K*>0, such that when K≥K*, the optimal contest is an all-pay auction with entry fee K*: The highest bidder wins V plus all entry fees collected if all participate; otherwise, all entrants share equally V and the entry fees. When K<K*, there exists a cutoff integer n*(K), weakly increasing in K, such that the optimal contest is an all-pay auction with entry fee K: When there are more than n*(K) entrants, the highest bidder wins V and all entry fees; when there are less than n*(K) entrants, all entrants share equally V and the entry fees; when exactly n*(K) bidders enter, the highest bidder wins a prize weakly smaller than V plus the entry fees and all others share equally the rest. In particular, when K is relatively small, the optimum is a winner-take-all all-pay auction with entry fee K, in which the highest bidder wins V plus all entry fees collected, regardless of the number of entrants.
主讲人介绍：
Bin Liu is currently an assistant professor at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. His research interests include mechanism design, auctions and contests, and industrial organization. His work appears in International Economic Review , Journal of Economic Theory , the RAND Journal of Economics, among others.
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