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sidenav header background[4月6日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2017-04-05 02:46 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2017年4月6日（周四）14:00-15:30
地点：北京大学朗润园万众楼小教室
主讲人：刘琦（北京大学光华管理学院金融学助理教授）
题目： Contracting and Feedback摘要：We study the effect of financial market conditions on managerial compensation structure. First, we analyze the optimal pay-for-performance in a model in which corporate decisions and firm value are both endogenous to trading due to feedback from information contained in stock prices. In a less frictional financial market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions, and this information substitutes out part of direct incentive provision in compensation contracts. Thus, the optimal pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reductions in market frictions. Second, we test our theory using two quasi-natural experiments and find evidence that is consistent with the theory. Our results indicate that the financial market environment plays an important role in shaping CEO compensation structure.
主讲人简介：北京大学光华管理学院金融学助理教授。毕业于宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院，获金融博士学位。研究方向是公司金融，金融市场，和行为金融学。目前主要研究公司金融中的高管薪资问题。与Alex Edmans教授合作的论文“Inside Debt”发表于Review of Finance，并获得了2011年度Spӓngler IQAM最佳论文奖（runner-up of “2011 Spӓngler IQAM Best Paper Prize”），其与合作者的工作论文“Contracting and Feedback” R&R at AER。
主讲人主页：http://crm.gsm.pku.edu.cn/psc/CRMPRD_1/EMPLOYEE/CRM/s/WEBLIB_SPE_ISCT.TZ_SETSPE_ISCRIPT.FieldFormula.IScript_SpecialPages?TZ_SPE_ID=309
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[4月6日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2017-04-05 02:46 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2017年4月6日（周四）14:00-15:30
地点：北京大学朗润园万众楼小教室
主讲人：刘琦（北京大学光华管理学院金融学助理教授）
题目： Contracting and Feedback摘要：We study the effect of financial market conditions on managerial compensation structure. First, we analyze the optimal pay-for-performance in a model in which corporate decisions and firm value are both endogenous to trading due to feedback from information contained in stock prices. In a less frictional financial market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions, and this information substitutes out part of direct incentive provision in compensation contracts. Thus, the optimal pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reductions in market frictions. Second, we test our theory using two quasi-natural experiments and find evidence that is consistent with the theory. Our results indicate that the financial market environment plays an important role in shaping CEO compensation structure.
主讲人简介：北京大学光华管理学院金融学助理教授。毕业于宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院，获金融博士学位。研究方向是公司金融，金融市场，和行为金融学。目前主要研究公司金融中的高管薪资问题。与Alex Edmans教授合作的论文“Inside Debt”发表于Review of Finance，并获得了2011年度Spӓngler IQAM最佳论文奖（runner-up of “2011 Spӓngler IQAM Best Paper Prize”），其与合作者的工作论文“Contracting and Feedback” R&R at AER。
主讲人主页：http://crm.gsm.pku.edu.cn/psc/CRMPRD_1/EMPLOYEE/CRM/s/WEBLIB_SPE_ISCT.TZ_SETSPE_ISCRIPT.FieldFormula.IScript_SpecialPages?TZ_SPE_ID=309
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