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sidenav header background[9月27日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2018-09-25 05:33 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2018年9月27日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：北京大学朗润园致福轩会议室
主讲人：吴泽南（北京大学经济学院助理教授）
题目：Feedback and Favoritism in Sequential Elimination Contests
摘要：this paper studies the optimal design of sequential-elimination contests. The contest proceeds in two stages, with N contestants participating in the first stage and M<N of them surviving the elimination and competing for the actual prize in the finale. We explore the optimal feedback policy for the contest, i.e., whether the contest designer should publicize contestants' interim ranking prior to the finale. We show that the optimum depends on the objective function for contest design. The contest designer prefers opacity---i.e., concealing the information---if she aims to maximize total effort in the contest. However, transparency---i.e., publicizing contestants' interim ranking---may outperform if the designer maximizes the expected winner's total effort along the hierarchical ladder. We further consider an extended model in which the designer can place different weights on finalists' effort entries in the contest success function based on their interim ranks. The baseline model is thus a special case of the extended one, because outright elimination is equivalent to placing excessively small weights on bottom-ranked contestants. We show that with endogenously chosen biases, opacity outperforms in generating total effort, while transparency emerges as the optimum when the expected winner's total effort is at stake. These results also yield ample practical implications.
主讲人简介：吴泽南博士，北京大学经济学院助理教授。2015年毕业于美国宾夕法尼亚大学，获得经济学博士学位。研究领域为应用微观理论，产业组织理论以及保险市场。研究成果在Rand Journal of Economics，Journal of Economics and Management Strategy，Economics Letters等期刊上发表。
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[9月27日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2018-09-25 05:33 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2018年9月27日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：北京大学朗润园致福轩会议室
主讲人：吴泽南（北京大学经济学院助理教授）
题目：Feedback and Favoritism in Sequential Elimination Contests
摘要：this paper studies the optimal design of sequential-elimination contests. The contest proceeds in two stages, with N contestants participating in the first stage and M<N of them surviving the elimination and competing for the actual prize in the finale. We explore the optimal feedback policy for the contest, i.e., whether the contest designer should publicize contestants' interim ranking prior to the finale. We show that the optimum depends on the objective function for contest design. The contest designer prefers opacity---i.e., concealing the information---if she aims to maximize total effort in the contest. However, transparency---i.e., publicizing contestants' interim ranking---may outperform if the designer maximizes the expected winner's total effort along the hierarchical ladder. We further consider an extended model in which the designer can place different weights on finalists' effort entries in the contest success function based on their interim ranks. The baseline model is thus a special case of the extended one, because outright elimination is equivalent to placing excessively small weights on bottom-ranked contestants. We show that with endogenously chosen biases, opacity outperforms in generating total effort, while transparency emerges as the optimum when the expected winner's total effort is at stake. These results also yield ample practical implications.
主讲人简介：吴泽南博士，北京大学经济学院助理教授。2015年毕业于美国宾夕法尼亚大学，获得经济学博士学位。研究领域为应用微观理论，产业组织理论以及保险市场。研究成果在Rand Journal of Economics，Journal of Economics and Management Strategy，Economics Letters等期刊上发表。
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