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sidenav header background[11月29日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2018-11-23 01:02 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
微观经济学workshop: The Promotion Club
时间：2018年11月29日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：致福轩会议室
主讲人：范昕宇
题目： The Promotion Club
作者： Xinyu Fan (CKGSB) and Shuo Chen (Fudan University)
摘要: Abstract: We consider a tournament-like incentive scheme called the "promotion club": Principal selects, from n agents, m top-performing ones into a club, and then promote one from within a club based fully on principal's idiosyncratic preference ("mindset"). Intuitively, m=1 indicates a tournament, and m=n, cronyism. We show that a proper (m≥2) promotion club often helps alleviate the loyalty-competency trade-off, for two reasons: 1. effort features an inverted-U shape with club size; 2. larger club size makes it easier to recruit a potential crony. However, principal always tends to oversize the club, leading to effort distortions. We further show that the existence of some publicly known crony/well-connected agents may lead to two equilibria: a shirk equilibrium when club size is large and all agents shirk; and a work equilibrium where club size is small and well-connected agents may work even harder than in a tournament.We use promotion data of Chinese governments at different levels to test our model predictions. Our theory and empirical evidence helps to explain how a regime with centralized personnel control (e.g. China) manages to incentivize subordinates for high efforts, while maintaining decent probability to recruit loyal cronies. 主讲人信息: Xinyu Fan is an assistant professor of economics at Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business. He received his Ph.D. in economics from UCLA in 2018. His research interests include applied game theory, political economy, organizational economics, economic history and industrial organization.
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[11月29日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2018-11-23 01:02 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
微观经济学workshop: The Promotion Club
时间：2018年11月29日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：致福轩会议室
主讲人：范昕宇
题目： The Promotion Club
作者： Xinyu Fan (CKGSB) and Shuo Chen (Fudan University)
摘要: Abstract: We consider a tournament-like incentive scheme called the "promotion club": Principal selects, from n agents, m top-performing ones into a club, and then promote one from within a club based fully on principal's idiosyncratic preference ("mindset"). Intuitively, m=1 indicates a tournament, and m=n, cronyism. We show that a proper (m≥2) promotion club often helps alleviate the loyalty-competency trade-off, for two reasons: 1. effort features an inverted-U shape with club size; 2. larger club size makes it easier to recruit a potential crony. However, principal always tends to oversize the club, leading to effort distortions. We further show that the existence of some publicly known crony/well-connected agents may lead to two equilibria: a shirk equilibrium when club size is large and all agents shirk; and a work equilibrium where club size is small and well-connected agents may work even harder than in a tournament.We use promotion data of Chinese governments at different levels to test our model predictions. Our theory and empirical evidence helps to explain how a regime with centralized personnel control (e.g. China) manages to incentivize subordinates for high efforts, while maintaining decent probability to recruit loyal cronies. 主讲人信息: Xinyu Fan is an assistant professor of economics at Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business. He received his Ph.D. in economics from UCLA in 2018. His research interests include applied game theory, political economy, organizational economics, economic history and industrial organization.
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