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[12月12日]能源与环境经济学workshop

发布日期：2016-12-05 05:47    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

题目： Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Climate Tipping

报告人：刘馨 (中科院科技咨询战略研究院) 

时间： 2016年12月12日（周一） 9:00-10:30

地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心小教室

 

摘要：  International environmental agreements (IEAs) can be an important way to increase the efficiency of emission abatement and climate change mitigation. This paper investigates the effect of possible tipping events, which would bring catastrophic and irreversible damage to the ecological system and human society, on individual countries’ emission decisions and the stable size of IEAs in various scenarios, using a game-theoretic model. The results show that if the CO2 concentration threshold for triggering the tipping events is high, the possibility of climate tipping would have no effect on size of IEAs. However, if the threshold for tipping is low, the climate system would not pass the tipping point for the case with a high post-tipping damage, while it would pass the tipping point for the case with a low post-tipping damage. Moreover, the effect of possible tipping events on the size of coalition would change if the signatories’ coalition has the first-mover advantage, the possibility of tipping would increase the size of coalition. Otherwise, and the possibility of tipping would decrease the size of IEAs.

 

报告人简介： 刘馨，中国科学院科技咨询战略研究院在读博士。研究领域是能源与环境经济学，主要研究方向是不可再生资源的管理及国际间合作，国际气候协议的签署问题，动态博弈的应用及项目中不同利益相关方间的收益-风险分担问题等。

 


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