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sidenav header background[9月22日]管理学workshop
发布日期：2016-09-16 03:45 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Product Line Design with Uninformed Consumer Preferences: The Implications for Data Collection
Speaker: Zibin Xu, Ph.D candidate in marketing at the University of Southern California
Time: September 22th (Thursday) 12:30pm-14:00pm
Location: Wanzhong Building（万众小教室）National School of Development, Peking U.
请要选这门课的同学注意：
确定选课的同学请在9.22这次的课上签到确认选课。研究生教务以此次签到名单作为选课名单。 Workshop的成绩将会基于出勤和一个assignment（具体内容未定）。 每次workshop都请大家在签到表上签到。Abstract
With the explosion of digital technologies, marketers can collect abundance of usage data to learn about consumer preferences and design relevant products. However, consumer protection advocates raise worries that data collection may also subject consumers to exploitation through better price discrimination. This concern is especially important when consumers have uninformed preferences imperfect prior knowledge about their marginal match value with the firm’s product quality. By collecting data in aggregate, firm can isolate the environmental noises that affect consumers’ usage experience and better estimate consumers’ match value than consumers themselves.
This research examines three questions related to anonymous usage data collection: Do consumers receive better fitting products or simply have more surplus extracted? When should consumers collectively opt out? Is data collection ever unprofitable? I develop an analytical model of a monopoly firm designing vertically-differentiated products for rational consumers who observe noisy private signals about their marginal match value of product quality. Collecting these signals may improve both the firm’s profit and every consumer’s surplus, when rational suspicion prevents the firm from manipulating consumers’ beliefs. It is firm-optimal to signal to the uninformed consumers with high match value by lowering the price of the high quality product while raising the quality of the low quality product. This tends to reverse the classic quality distortion in product line design. In other cases, however, data collection may either (1) increase the firm’s ability of second-degree price discrimination, leading consumers to collectively opt out, or (2) harm the firm due to uninformed consumers’ suspicions about being exploited.
Zibin Xu is a Ph.D candidate in marketing at the University of Southern California. He studies the economics of marketing strategy, particularly as it applies to pricing, communication, product line design, consumer privacy, and preference learning. He has taught entrepreneurship and marketing fundamentals at three American universities and won university excellence awards in teaching at USC. His empirical research has appeared in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management.
For further information, please visit:
https://sites.google.com/site/zibinxu/
Your participation is warmly welcomed!
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[9月22日]管理学workshop
发布日期：2016-09-16 03:45 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Product Line Design with Uninformed Consumer Preferences: The Implications for Data Collection
Speaker: Zibin Xu, Ph.D candidate in marketing at the University of Southern California
Time: September 22th (Thursday) 12:30pm-14:00pm
Location: Wanzhong Building（万众小教室）National School of Development, Peking U.
请要选这门课的同学注意：
确定选课的同学请在9.22这次的课上签到确认选课。研究生教务以此次签到名单作为选课名单。 Workshop的成绩将会基于出勤和一个assignment（具体内容未定）。 每次workshop都请大家在签到表上签到。Abstract
With the explosion of digital technologies, marketers can collect abundance of usage data to learn about consumer preferences and design relevant products. However, consumer protection advocates raise worries that data collection may also subject consumers to exploitation through better price discrimination. This concern is especially important when consumers have uninformed preferences imperfect prior knowledge about their marginal match value with the firm’s product quality. By collecting data in aggregate, firm can isolate the environmental noises that affect consumers’ usage experience and better estimate consumers’ match value than consumers themselves.
This research examines three questions related to anonymous usage data collection: Do consumers receive better fitting products or simply have more surplus extracted? When should consumers collectively opt out? Is data collection ever unprofitable? I develop an analytical model of a monopoly firm designing vertically-differentiated products for rational consumers who observe noisy private signals about their marginal match value of product quality. Collecting these signals may improve both the firm’s profit and every consumer’s surplus, when rational suspicion prevents the firm from manipulating consumers’ beliefs. It is firm-optimal to signal to the uninformed consumers with high match value by lowering the price of the high quality product while raising the quality of the low quality product. This tends to reverse the classic quality distortion in product line design. In other cases, however, data collection may either (1) increase the firm’s ability of second-degree price discrimination, leading consumers to collectively opt out, or (2) harm the firm due to uninformed consumers’ suspicions about being exploited.
Zibin Xu is a Ph.D candidate in marketing at the University of Southern California. He studies the economics of marketing strategy, particularly as it applies to pricing, communication, product line design, consumer privacy, and preference learning. He has taught entrepreneurship and marketing fundamentals at three American universities and won university excellence awards in teaching at USC. His empirical research has appeared in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management.
For further information, please visit:
https://sites.google.com/site/zibinxu/
Your participation is warmly welcomed!
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