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[12月13日]微观经济学workshop

发布日期：2018-12-10 11:08    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

微观经济学workshop:  Timely Persuasion

时间：2018年12月13日（周四）10:30-12:00  

地点：致福轩会议室

主讲人：周臻

题目：Timely Persuasion

摘要: Upon arrival of a shock, agents get a short time window to exit. There is strategic complementarity in exit, while delayed exit is costly. Agents are uncertain about the intensity of the shock and get some noisy information about it. This could generate a panic - the agents choose to exit even when it is not warranted. There is a principal who, unlike the agents, can observe the intensity of the shock and the history of exit. This paper answers the following question - To minimize the incidence of panic, what information should the principal disclose? We propose a simple information disclosure policy. At some date, the principal publicly sends a disaster alert that confirms whether exiting has become the dominant strategy or not. If the principal can set this alert in a timely manner, then regardless of the noisy information, the unique rationalizable strategy for any agent is “wait for the alert and not exit if the alert is not triggered.” This policy completely eliminates the panic. 主讲人信息: 周臻，纽约大学经济系博士，清华大学五道口金融学院助理教授，周老师研究兴趣在微观理论。 If you want to be reminded each time before our workshop, please send an email to:  micro_workshop@vip.163.com。


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