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sidenav header background[12月20日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2018-12-13 03:43 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
微观经济学workshop: Trust and Betrayals Reputation Building and Milking without Commitment
时间：2018年12月20日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：致福轩会议室
主讲人：Di Pei
题目： Trust and Betrayals Reputation Building and Milking without Commitment
摘要:I introduce a reputation model where all types of the reputation building agent are rational and are facing lack-of-commitment problems. I study a repeated trust game in which a patient player (e.g. seller) wishes to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g. buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is her persistent private information. I provide a tractable formula for the patient player’s highest equilibrium payoff, which converges to her mixed Stackelberg payoff when the lowest benefit in the support of the prior belief vanishes. In equilibria that attain this highest payoff, reputations are built and milked gradually and the patient player’s behavior must be non-stationary. This enables her to extract information rent in unbound- ed number of periods while minimizing her long-term reputation loss. Moreover, her reputation in equilibrium can be computed by counting the number of times she has betrayed as well as been trustworthy in the past. This captures some realistic features of online rating systems.
主讲人信息: Di Pei is an assistant professor in Economics, Northwestern University. He received his Ph.D from MIT in 2018, Master from Toulouse and Bachelor from Tsinghua University. His current interests is in micro theory, especially reputation. He has published papers on JET, GEB and won the Review of Economic Studies European Tour this year. If you want to be reminded each time before our workshop, please send an email to: micro_workshop@vip.163.com。
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[12月20日]微观经济学workshop
发布日期：2018-12-13 03:43 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
微观经济学workshop: Trust and Betrayals Reputation Building and Milking without Commitment
时间：2018年12月20日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：致福轩会议室
主讲人：Di Pei
题目： Trust and Betrayals Reputation Building and Milking without Commitment
摘要:I introduce a reputation model where all types of the reputation building agent are rational and are facing lack-of-commitment problems. I study a repeated trust game in which a patient player (e.g. seller) wishes to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g. buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is her persistent private information. I provide a tractable formula for the patient player’s highest equilibrium payoff, which converges to her mixed Stackelberg payoff when the lowest benefit in the support of the prior belief vanishes. In equilibria that attain this highest payoff, reputations are built and milked gradually and the patient player’s behavior must be non-stationary. This enables her to extract information rent in unbound- ed number of periods while minimizing her long-term reputation loss. Moreover, her reputation in equilibrium can be computed by counting the number of times she has betrayed as well as been trustworthy in the past. This captures some realistic features of online rating systems.
主讲人信息: Di Pei is an assistant professor in Economics, Northwestern University. He received his Ph.D from MIT in 2018, Master from Toulouse and Bachelor from Tsinghua University. His current interests is in micro theory, especially reputation. He has published papers on JET, GEB and won the Review of Economic Studies European Tour this year. If you want to be reminded each time before our workshop, please send an email to: micro_workshop@vip.163.com。
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