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sidenav header background[9月15日] 宏观经济学Workshop
发布日期：2022-09-13 09:10 来源：
An Empirical Schumpeterian Growth Model with IPR Enforcement
主讲人：Qiugu HE
时间：9月15日（周四）14:00-15:30
Zoom会议号：841 5399 7762
Zoom会议密码：670292
摘要：
Chinese lawsuits and industry survey data suggest two facts: 1) firm average R&D expenditure is lower in the strict IPR province-industry group when market is monopolistic. 2) Firm average RD expenditure decreases in competition less significantly for the strict IPR-provinces group. To explain why this is the case, I build a Schumpeterian growth model with technology imitation, endogenous market structure, and IPR enforcement. In a weak IPR environment, imitation is an easy way for a firm to accumulate the knowledge capital needed for innovation. However, such knowledge capital is easily destroyed when facing competition. I estimate the model and find that approximately three-quarters of knowledge capital is formed by imitation. I quantify the general equilibrium and find: 1) weak IPR policy promotes aggregate innovation through knowledge diffusion. 2) An R&D subsidy policy does not significantly improve a firm’s average innovation under weak IPR, because it also encourages firms to imitate to obtain knowledge capital for the R&D subsidy.
主讲人介绍：
Qiugu He is an assitant professor at the School of Economics at Nankai University. He received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from Singapore Management University, a master degree in software engineering from Peking University, and a B.A. degree in software engineering from the Central South University. His research interests lie in International trade, Macroeconomic Growth, and Industrial Organization.
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[9月15日] 宏观经济学Workshop
发布日期：2022-09-13 09:10 来源：
An Empirical Schumpeterian Growth Model with IPR Enforcement
主讲人：Qiugu HE
时间：9月15日（周四）14:00-15:30
Zoom会议号：841 5399 7762
Zoom会议密码：670292
摘要：
Chinese lawsuits and industry survey data suggest two facts: 1) firm average R&D expenditure is lower in the strict IPR province-industry group when market is monopolistic. 2) Firm average RD expenditure decreases in competition less significantly for the strict IPR-provinces group. To explain why this is the case, I build a Schumpeterian growth model with technology imitation, endogenous market structure, and IPR enforcement. In a weak IPR environment, imitation is an easy way for a firm to accumulate the knowledge capital needed for innovation. However, such knowledge capital is easily destroyed when facing competition. I estimate the model and find that approximately three-quarters of knowledge capital is formed by imitation. I quantify the general equilibrium and find: 1) weak IPR policy promotes aggregate innovation through knowledge diffusion. 2) An R&D subsidy policy does not significantly improve a firm’s average innovation under weak IPR, because it also encourages firms to imitate to obtain knowledge capital for the R&D subsidy.
主讲人介绍：
Qiugu He is an assitant professor at the School of Economics at Nankai University. He received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from Singapore Management University, a master degree in software engineering from Peking University, and a B.A. degree in software engineering from the Central South University. His research interests lie in International trade, Macroeconomic Growth, and Industrial Organization.
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