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sidenav header background[12月24日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2020-12-21 03:58 来源：
Dynamic Assignment with Limited Commitment
时间：2020年12月24日（周四）10:30-12:00
主讲人: 杨仁琨 (俄亥俄州立大学博士生)
主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠
参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠
地点：线上（会议链接附在文末）
报告摘要：
We study dynamic mechanism design when transfers are not allowed and the principal cannot commit to future mechanisms. Specifically, the principal (she) decides in each period whether to allocate a good to the agent (he), whose private value evolves over time. The efficiency-maximizing principal bears a cost of allocation that is not internalized by the agent. The optimal mechanism in the two-period model has two main features. First, the principal elicits truthful report from the low-type agent in the first period by promising him one unit in the second period. Second, to fulfill this promise the principal strategically garbles (without observing) the agent's initial report. The principal relies on such a garbling device to manipulate her future belief and mitigate the tension between the necessity of using future allocation to provide current incentives and the lack of commitment in the long run. As the time horizon expands, the efficiency loss from both the noisy communication and the distortion of future allocation is backloaded and vanishes in the infinite horizon limit.
主讲人简介：
Renkun Yang is a Job Market Candidate from the Ohio State University (expected graduation date: May 2021). His field of research is microeconomic theory. His current research agenda includes dynamic mechanism design and information design, with applications to takeover auctions and industrial organization.
形式：ZOOM会议
会议号：961 8215 9296
密码：543305
会议链接：https://zoom.com.cn/j/96182159296?pwd=cXhKVEVwTU1WQnNOWkhqVWpzQ3B4UT09
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[12月24日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2020-12-21 03:58 来源：
Dynamic Assignment with Limited Commitment
时间：2020年12月24日（周四）10:30-12:00
主讲人: 杨仁琨 (俄亥俄州立大学博士生)
主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠
参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠
地点：线上（会议链接附在文末）
报告摘要：
We study dynamic mechanism design when transfers are not allowed and the principal cannot commit to future mechanisms. Specifically, the principal (she) decides in each period whether to allocate a good to the agent (he), whose private value evolves over time. The efficiency-maximizing principal bears a cost of allocation that is not internalized by the agent. The optimal mechanism in the two-period model has two main features. First, the principal elicits truthful report from the low-type agent in the first period by promising him one unit in the second period. Second, to fulfill this promise the principal strategically garbles (without observing) the agent's initial report. The principal relies on such a garbling device to manipulate her future belief and mitigate the tension between the necessity of using future allocation to provide current incentives and the lack of commitment in the long run. As the time horizon expands, the efficiency loss from both the noisy communication and the distortion of future allocation is backloaded and vanishes in the infinite horizon limit.
主讲人简介：
Renkun Yang is a Job Market Candidate from the Ohio State University (expected graduation date: May 2021). His field of research is microeconomic theory. His current research agenda includes dynamic mechanism design and information design, with applications to takeover auctions and industrial organization.
形式：ZOOM会议
会议号：961 8215 9296
密码：543305
会议链接：https://zoom.com.cn/j/96182159296?pwd=cXhKVEVwTU1WQnNOWkhqVWpzQ3B4UT09
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