时间：2025年10月22日（周三）13:30-15:00

地点：北大国发院承泽园245教室

主持人：张丹丹、黄炜

参与老师：雷晓燕、李玲、刘国恩、易君健

主讲人：刘冲，北京大学经济学院

摘要：This study examines how local governments in China strategically provide tax incentives to firms that demonstrate strong economic performance, fostering a collaborative government-business relationship aimed at advancing local development goals. Leveraging firm-level data from the National Tax Survey, we find that sub-national governments preferentially lower the effective tax rates for prominent local businesses that contribute significantly to the local economy. To address potential confounding factors such as political favoritism, tax avoidance strategies, or special deals, we utilize quasi-experimental shocks and leadership turnover as identification strategies. Our analysis further reveals that while local business champions benefit from favorable tax treatment, they are also subject to heightened scrutiny, including a greater likelihood of tax audits and more stringent penalties for tax evasion. Collectively, these findings are consistent with a model of "disciplined favoritism" that characterizes state-business relations in China.

主讲人简介：刘冲，北京大学博雅青年学者，长聘副教授，财政学系主任，入选国家级重大人才青年计划，担任Review of Development Economics共同主编，《经济科学》《产业经济评论》副主编。研究领域为公共经济学和发展经济学。近年来在Review of Economics and Statistics、Economic Journal、Journal of Development Economics、《经济研究》《管理世界》等国内外权威期刊接受或发表论文五十余篇。主持国家自然科学基金重点专项等十项课题，聚焦国家重大战略需求的咨政报告20余次获得采纳和肯定性批示。

（更多详细信息可参考刘冲老师个人主页：https://econ.pku.edu.cn/szdw/zzjs/ybjs/sczxx/327555.htm）