时间：3月27日（周四）10:00-11:30

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主讲人：袁照能（Nanyang Technological University）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

题目: Dynamics of Revision and Relation

摘要：I study an infinitely repeated game between an agent and a principal, where the principal has the option to ask the agent to revise his work, and the revision is asked based on subjective evaluation. Revision can improve the output quality, but it also introduces incentive problems when the true motion of revision–whether out of efficiency or greed—is the principal’s private information and thus unknown to the agent. The optimal relational contract speaks to how the principal optimally manages the revision and how the relationship evolves over time. I show that the relationship starts with excessive revision but ends with insufficient revision. As time progresses, both the revision declines and the relationship deteriorates. Moreover, the principal gradually cedes her revision option as the agent gains autonomy on his work.

主讲人介绍：Yuan Zhaoneng is Assistant Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technological University. Her research interest lies in organizational economics and applied microeconomic theory in general. She has published in leading international journals such as Management Science and Review of Economics and Statistics.