时间：2025年2月28日（周五）13:30-15:00

地点：北大国发院承泽园344教室

主持人： 雷晓燕、易君健

参与老师：张丹丹、李玲、刘国恩、黄炜

主讲人：黄一泓，北京大学光华管理学院

摘要：Almost all firms rely on supervisor discretion to select and motivate workers. But what are the benefits and costs of doing so? In partnership with a large garment manufacturing firm in Tanzania, we implement a series of field experiments to examine supervisor discretion in the selection of workers for promotion to managerial positions. In a first field experiment with supervisors, we randomize whether supervisors face financial incentives based on the quality of their referrals. In a complementary experiment with workers, we randomly vary whether supervisor referrals are emphasized in the selection process when workers make application decisions. Our results show that discretion crowds in supervisors’ private information about the managerial potential of workers. Supervisors use private information beyond what the firm could infer from existing administrative data, workers’ self-assessments, or coworker referrals. However, discretion also generates costs for firms. Supervisor referrals are not perfectly aligned with the firm’s objectives, and supervisors show preferences consistent with gender bias and favoritism. Furthermore, discretion is disliked by workers and reduces the number of workers who apply for promotion. Despite the costs of discretion, supervisors select workers with significantly higher measured managerial ability relative to more objective selection methods.

主讲人简介：

黄一泓，北京大学光华管理学院的助理教授，于2024年获得哈佛大学经济学博士学位。主要研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学和政治经济学。她的研究通过行为经济学理论的视角理解现实世界中的现象，例如对社会规范的认知、政治话语、媒体偏见和信息在社交网络中的流动等。