-
首页
-
- 首页
- WORKSHOP预告
发展政经workshop:Pro-Manufacturing Land Policies of Competing Local Governments: A Quantitative Analysis of China
发布日期：2024-05-22 12:00 来源：
时间：2024年5月22日 14:00-15:30
地点：承泽园245教室
主讲人：奚锡灿（复旦大学）
参与老师：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬；
（经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
题目：Pro-Manufacturing Land Policies of Competing Local Governments: A Quantitative Analysis of China
摘要：Local government policies can correct market inefficiencies but are also shaped by spatial political economy considerations. We study the rationale and impact of local land policies in China, where local governments have a de facto monopoly in regional urban land markets and exhibit a pronounced pro-manufacturing land allocation across sectors. We develop a multi-sector quantitative spatial equilibrium model where local governments compete non-cooperatively through local land policies. Calibrating and simulating the model, we find that the observed policies are, on average, comparable to the Nash policy when local governments maximize manufacturing output. This result reveals a manufacturing bias in the observed land policies. When local governments instead prioritize maximizing local real income per capita, we find that the land allocation to manufacturing still considerably exceeds that in a competitive market. However, this pro-manufacturing policy results in higher local real income per capita across regions. Finally, when considering the goal of maximizing national average real income per capita, we find that the non-cooperative outcome is nearly as effective as the cooperative equilibrium.
个人简介：奚锡灿，复旦大学经济学院长聘副教授，研究领域为宏观经济学、发展经济学和环境经济学。研究论文曾发表于PNAS、AEJ:Macro、JEDC、CJE、《经济研究》、《管理世界》和《世界经济》等国内外学术期刊。
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
发展政经workshop:Pro-Manufacturing Land Policies of Competing Local Governments: A Quantitative Analysis of China
发布日期：2024-05-22 12:00 来源：
时间：2024年5月22日 14:00-15:30
地点：承泽园245教室
主讲人：奚锡灿（复旦大学）
参与老师：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬；
（经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
题目：Pro-Manufacturing Land Policies of Competing Local Governments: A Quantitative Analysis of China
摘要：Local government policies can correct market inefficiencies but are also shaped by spatial political economy considerations. We study the rationale and impact of local land policies in China, where local governments have a de facto monopoly in regional urban land markets and exhibit a pronounced pro-manufacturing land allocation across sectors. We develop a multi-sector quantitative spatial equilibrium model where local governments compete non-cooperatively through local land policies. Calibrating and simulating the model, we find that the observed policies are, on average, comparable to the Nash policy when local governments maximize manufacturing output. This result reveals a manufacturing bias in the observed land policies. When local governments instead prioritize maximizing local real income per capita, we find that the land allocation to manufacturing still considerably exceeds that in a competitive market. However, this pro-manufacturing policy results in higher local real income per capita across regions. Finally, when considering the goal of maximizing national average real income per capita, we find that the non-cooperative outcome is nearly as effective as the cooperative equilibrium.
个人简介：奚锡灿，复旦大学经济学院长聘副教授，研究领域为宏观经济学、发展经济学和环境经济学。研究论文曾发表于PNAS、AEJ:Macro、JEDC、CJE、《经济研究》、《管理世界》和《世界经济》等国内外学术期刊。
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
