国际经济学workshop: Managing Expectations with Exchange Rate Policy

发布日期:2023-11-21 12:00    来源:

国际经济学workshop: Managing Expectations with Exchange Rate Policy

主讲人:Pierre De Leo(University of Maryland)

主持人:余昌华(北京大学国家发展研究院)

时间:2023年11月21日(周二)上午10:00-11:30(北京时间)

地点:承泽园249教室

Zoom会议号:926 3889 7210

密码:908060

摘要:

Should exchange rate policy communication be transparent or intentionally opaque? We show that it depends on whether expectations depart from rationality. We develop a macroeconomic model in which agents overreact to their private information about fundamentals and use the exchange rate as a public signal to learn about the private information of others. In this environment, central bank communication surrounding foreign exchange (FX) interventions can influence the information content of the exchange rate and can be used to “manage expectations.” While FX interventions that are publicly announced provide additional information about fundamentals, secret FX interventions can instead decrease the informational content of the exchange rate. If the overreaction bias is strong enough, it can be optimal to intervene secretly to reduce the informativeness of the exchange rate. Our model rationalizes observed practices in exchange rate policies such as managed floats and the opacity surrounding FX interventions.

主讲人介绍:

Pierre De Leo is an international macroeconomist, Assistant Professor at the Economics Department of the University of Maryland. His research focuses on the role of capital market imperfections and information frictions in the determination of exchange rates, international business cycles, and the transmission of economic shocks, as well as their implications for monetary and exchange rate policy. Pierre is an Italian national and holds a PhD from Boston College. His research has been published in the Review of Economics and Statistics.


 

 


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