-
首页
-
- 首页
- WORKSHOP预告
第五次发展政经workshop
发布日期：2023-10-25 12:00 来源：
本期的主讲人是北京大学国发院的博士生赵家琪和邱昱程。讲座具体信息如下，欢迎感兴趣的老师参加！
时间：2023年10月25日（周三）11:30-13:30
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园131教室
主讲人：赵家琪（北京大学国家发展研究院2021级博士生）
邱昱程（北京大学国家发展研究院2022级博士生）
参与老师：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬；
（经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
报告一：Winning Hearts after Tying Hands: The Political Impact of Land Titling Reform in China
摘要：
We show that property rights protection can increase political support of property owners on government. We exploit an agricultural land titling reform in China with staggered implementation since 2011. The reform provided formal legal land certificates to households, thus substantially improving property rights protection. We find that political support on government rises after the reform. The increase in government approval is not likely attributed to improved household economic status, but instead to declines in expropriation behaviors from local government officials. The effect is stronger where informal institution is weak before the reform. We provide evidence that the increase in political support accompanied with more compliance with the state.
报告人简介：赵家琪，北京大学国家发展研究院2021级博士研究生，研究领域为发展和政治经济学。
报告二：Adaptive Diarchy: Authority between Two Heads
摘要：
Many parts of China's bureaucracy feature diarchy where two executives with ambiguous allocation of de facto power are appointed. We propose a rationale for these diarchial arrangements, showing how a ruler may benefit from subordinates' collusion while introducing mutual check between them. In our model, a principal, who retains formal authority to decide on a project, relies on a biased agent for information and execution. A motivated supervisor can be appointed, but the agent can compromise and share profitable execution rights with him. In an uncertain world, the relationship between them features either mutual check or collusion in different times. Although the formal decision-making authority is carved in stone, the allocation of real authority is adaptive ex post in equilibrium. We also embed our baseline setting in an infinite-horizon model to explore the historical regime shift from roving to stationary supervisors. Depending on public histories, adaptive diarchy emerges, with the principal gradually tolerating collusion as a result of learning.
报告人简介：邱昱程，北京大学国家发展研究院2022级博士研究生，研究领域为政治经济学和组织经济学。
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
第五次发展政经workshop
发布日期：2023-10-25 12:00 来源：
本期的主讲人是北京大学国发院的博士生赵家琪和邱昱程。讲座具体信息如下，欢迎感兴趣的老师参加！
时间：2023年10月25日（周三）11:30-13:30
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园131教室
主讲人：赵家琪（北京大学国家发展研究院2021级博士生）
邱昱程（北京大学国家发展研究院2022级博士生）
参与老师：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬；
（经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
报告一：Winning Hearts after Tying Hands: The Political Impact of Land Titling Reform in China
摘要：
We show that property rights protection can increase political support of property owners on government. We exploit an agricultural land titling reform in China with staggered implementation since 2011. The reform provided formal legal land certificates to households, thus substantially improving property rights protection. We find that political support on government rises after the reform. The increase in government approval is not likely attributed to improved household economic status, but instead to declines in expropriation behaviors from local government officials. The effect is stronger where informal institution is weak before the reform. We provide evidence that the increase in political support accompanied with more compliance with the state.
报告人简介：赵家琪，北京大学国家发展研究院2021级博士研究生，研究领域为发展和政治经济学。
报告二：Adaptive Diarchy: Authority between Two Heads
摘要：
Many parts of China's bureaucracy feature diarchy where two executives with ambiguous allocation of de facto power are appointed. We propose a rationale for these diarchial arrangements, showing how a ruler may benefit from subordinates' collusion while introducing mutual check between them. In our model, a principal, who retains formal authority to decide on a project, relies on a biased agent for information and execution. A motivated supervisor can be appointed, but the agent can compromise and share profitable execution rights with him. In an uncertain world, the relationship between them features either mutual check or collusion in different times. Although the formal decision-making authority is carved in stone, the allocation of real authority is adaptive ex post in equilibrium. We also embed our baseline setting in an infinite-horizon model to explore the historical regime shift from roving to stationary supervisors. Depending on public histories, adaptive diarchy emerges, with the principal gradually tolerating collusion as a result of learning.
报告人简介：邱昱程，北京大学国家发展研究院2022级博士研究生，研究领域为政治经济学和组织经济学。
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
