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微观理论Workshop:Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information
发布日期：2023-10-12 12:00 来源：
时间：10月12日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：经院302
主讲人：王子伟（武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information
单边不完全信息下匹配模型中的可理性化稳定性
摘要：This paper proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition of uninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self-consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion of stability for a given set of outcomes, and then iteratively apply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. We then provide two additional characterizations of our solution concept. The first characterization links the non-equilibrium approach we pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition.
这篇论文提出了一个用于研究单边不完全信息匹配市场的新的稳定性概念。一个关键的贡献是恰当定义了匹配个体的内生信念以及这些信念应当满足的自洽性条件。我们为一组给定的结果定义了一个稳定性标准，然后迭代地应用这个标准来删除不能被视为稳定的结果。我们的解概念，即可理性化稳定匹配结果的集合，是这个过程的极限。我们使用固定点刻画证明了可理性稳定结果的存在。然后，我们提供了此解概念的另外两种数学刻画。第一个刻画将我们使用的非均衡方法与刘庆民（2020）开创的均衡方法联系起来。第二个刻画揭示了迭代定义中隐含的认识论假设。
主讲人介绍：Ziwei Wang is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 2022. His research focuses on game theory, matching theory, and information economics. He has published an article on Social Choice and Welfare, and is actively refereeing for economics journals such as GEB, JEBO, JET, and REDesign.
王子伟，武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为博弈论，匹配理论和信息经济学。研究成果发表于经济学国际期刊Social Choice and Welfare，并担任Games and Economic Behavior，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Economic Theory，Review of Economic Design等期刊的匿名审稿人。
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首页
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微观理论Workshop:Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information
发布日期：2023-10-12 12:00 来源：
时间：10月12日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：经院302
主讲人：王子伟（武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information
单边不完全信息下匹配模型中的可理性化稳定性
摘要：This paper proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition of uninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self-consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion of stability for a given set of outcomes, and then iteratively apply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. We then provide two additional characterizations of our solution concept. The first characterization links the non-equilibrium approach we pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition.
这篇论文提出了一个用于研究单边不完全信息匹配市场的新的稳定性概念。一个关键的贡献是恰当定义了匹配个体的内生信念以及这些信念应当满足的自洽性条件。我们为一组给定的结果定义了一个稳定性标准，然后迭代地应用这个标准来删除不能被视为稳定的结果。我们的解概念，即可理性化稳定匹配结果的集合，是这个过程的极限。我们使用固定点刻画证明了可理性稳定结果的存在。然后，我们提供了此解概念的另外两种数学刻画。第一个刻画将我们使用的非均衡方法与刘庆民（2020）开创的均衡方法联系起来。第二个刻画揭示了迭代定义中隐含的认识论假设。
主讲人介绍：Ziwei Wang is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 2022. His research focuses on game theory, matching theory, and information economics. He has published an article on Social Choice and Welfare, and is actively refereeing for economics journals such as GEB, JEBO, JET, and REDesign.
王子伟，武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为博弈论，匹配理论和信息经济学。研究成果发表于经济学国际期刊Social Choice and Welfare，并担任Games and Economic Behavior，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Economic Theory，Review of Economic Design等期刊的匿名审稿人。
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