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北京大学国家发展研究院

微观理论workshop：Selling to a Group

发布日期：2022-03-03 12:00    来源：

主讲人: Elliot Lipnowski（Assistant professor, Columbia University）

主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

题目: Selling to a Group

时间：2022年3月3日（周四）9:30-11:00

地点：ZOOM会议

会议号：912 8799 6734

会议密码：801279

 

报告摘要：

A group of agents can collectively purchase a public good that yields heterogeneous benefits to its members. Combining a reduced-form implementation result with a duality argument, we characterize the seller’s profit-maximizing mechanism. Trade outcomes depend solely on a weighted average of the agents’ virtual values, with endogenous voting weights. Heterogeneity in voting weights reflects heterogeneity in agents’ value distributions, where agents with lower value distributions are given more weight in trade decisions. Simple pricing rules are generally not (even approximately) optimal.

主讲人简介：

Elliot Lipnowski is an assistant professor of economics at Columbia University, studying microeconomic theory. His interests include information disclosure, dynamic games, and strategic uncertainty.

 

 

 


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