Inefficient Investment Cycles

无效率的投资周期

时间：2021年12月16日 下午2:00 – 3:30

主讲人：徐思闯 (香港中文大学(深圳))

加入 Zoom 会议：https://zoom.us/j/92192401964?pwd=T0x3cWM2TFBoTWZGM0dkVlVxaGVoUT09

会议号：921 9240 1964

密码：707175

摘要：We study the efficiency properties of aggregate investment fluctuations in a continuous­time dynamic contract setting. An increase in aggregate investment demand increases the price of capital goods, which, in tum, aggravates the moral hazard problem. We show that the optimal competitive contract between households and financial intermediaries results in socially excessive investment during expansions and insufficient investment during recessions. We analytically characterize the optimal prudential policy and show that the fluctuations in aggregate productivity is the driver for two-sided inefficiencies over investment cycles.

主讲人简介：徐思闯是香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院的助理教授。他的主要研究兴趣是宏观经济学，金融经济学与国际经济学。他的文章发表在Journal of International Economics上。